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Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law 
KATHRYN E. KOVACS* 
This Article employs William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of 
superstatutes as a tool to argue that administrative common law that contradicts or 
ignores the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is illegitimate. Eskridge and 
Ferejohn conceive of statutes that emerge from a lengthy, public debate and take on 
great normative weight over time as “superstatutes.” Superstatute theory highlights 
the deficiency in deliberation about the meaning of the APA. The APA bears all the 
hallmarks of a superstatute. Unlike the typical federal superstatute, however, the 
APA is not administered by a single agency. Thus, to respect and encourage the 
civic-republican style of deliberation that Eskridge and Ferejohn espouse, courts 
must adhere more closely to the compromises encoded in the statute’s text, paying 
particular attention to the context and history of each individual provision. Courts 
should hesitate before moving too far towards the boundaries of the text’s possible 
meaning. Venturing beyond those boundaries altogether is even more troubling. In 
the absence of an agency that spurs public deliberation about the meaning of the 
APA, administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA should be 
presumed to be illegitimate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA or the “Act”)1 is one of the most 
important statutes in the United States Code. The Constitution assumes that 
administrative agencies will assist the President in fulfilling his executive duties, but 
it says nothing about agencies’ structures and functions or about their relationships 
with the other branches of government.2 After the explosion in the number of federal 
agencies in the early twentieth century,3 Congress stepped into the breach, setting forth 
basic principles of agency procedure and judicial review in the APA. The APA has 
taken on quasi-constitutional status.4 Although agency-specific statutes now abound, 
the APA is still the “fundamental charter” of the “Fourth Branch” of the government.5 
Administrative common law is at the heart of one of the oldest debates about the 
APA. Congress worked for years to pass the Act.6 It represented a monumental 
compromise between conservatives and liberals, and neither side was fully satisfied. 
Following its enactment, both sides set out to convince the courts that their view of 
the new law was the right view. Conservatives sold the law as imposing important 
new restrictions on agencies, while liberals viewed the law as simply restating pre-
existing common law.7 By and large, the liberals won. Traditionally, the APA is 
viewed as leaving ample room for the courts to continue to apply and develop 
administrative common law, or at least to read the Act’s terms loosely.8 That 
interpretation of the APA, however, does not respect the enormous effort that went 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012)). 
 2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction 
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1002, 1010 (2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional 
Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1281–82 
(2009) [hereinafter Eskridge and Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture]; Peter L. Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 573, 576–77 (1984). 
 3. In the first thirty years of the twentieth century, the number of federal administrative 
agencies doubled. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1996). 
 4. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1077 (2004); 
William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1017, 1033 (2006); Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s 
Adjudication Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1003, 1004 (2004); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the 
Gilded Age, 119 YALE L. J. 1362, 1365 (2010); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the 
Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1997). 
 5. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 856, 874 (2007). 
 6. Shepherd, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. at 1662–66. 
 8. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.17, 2.18, 6.37, 7.19, 
14.10 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE] (asserting that the 
courts do and should continue to develop administrative common law); LOUIS L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327–29, 336–37, 372 (1965) (asserting that 
the APA has had little effect on the common law of judicial review). 
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into constructing this unique enactment, much less the significant attention Congress 
has paid to the APA since its enactment. Nor does it pay heed to the need for open, 
public deliberation in a functioning democracy. 
In this Article, I view the APA through the lens of an important new theory of 
statutory interpretation: William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of 
superstatutes.9 Superstatute theory highlights the deficiency in deliberation about the 
meaning of the APA. That deliberation deficiency makes it problematic for courts to 
interpret the APA’s terms loosely, much less create law that exceeds those terms 
altogether and contravenes Congress’s intent. Any interpretation of the APA should 
focus on the language of each individual provision, as well as its context and history, 
both before and after enactment. In the very least, courts should not ignore the APA. 
Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn employ the term “superstatute” to refer to 
statutes that have become “entrenched” in America’s statutory constitution.10 They 
are enacted “after lengthy normative debate” and “prove robust as a solution, a 
standard, or a norm over time.”11 Although Eskridge and Ferejohn did not identify 
the APA as a superstatute, the Act exemplifies this idea: it resulted from years of 
legislative activity and has become deeply entrenched. 
There is a general consensus that the APA is not a typical statute. Then-Professor 
Scalia observed in 1978 that “the Supreme Court regarded the APA as a sort of 
superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic 
framework that was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished.”12 Other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC]; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2000) [hereinafter 
Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory 
“constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Eskridge, America’s Statutory 
“constitution”]. Eskridge and Ferejohn’s work has contributed significantly to the development 
of legal theory. See, e.g., Paul Frymer, Statutes, Courts, and Democracy in America, 47 TULSA 
L. REV. 229, 234 (2011) (book review) (“vast, ambitious, intellectually provocative, and 
declarative”); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Growing a Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 647, 654 
(2011) (book review) (“inspiring”); Robert A. Katzmann, Introduction to The Yale Law Journal 
Online Symposium on Eskridge and Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes: The New American 
Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 293, 293 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum
/introduction-to-the-yale-law-journal-online-symposium-on-eskridge-and-ferejohns-a-republic
-of-statutes-the-new-american-constitution (“landmark collaboration”); Mathew D. McCubbins 
& Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory, 
120 YALE L. J. ONLINE 387, 406 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/superstaturoty
-entenchment-a-positive-and-normative-interrogatory (“an admirable—indeed historic—effort 
at big-picture legal theory”); Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes Interpret the Constitution, 120 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 297, 298 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-statutes-interpret
-the-constitution (“a major contribution”); Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a 
Republic of Statutes, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837, 862 (“important”). 
 10. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 111. 
 11. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216. Eskridge and Ferejohn 
abandoned the hyphen in “super-statutes” in their recent book. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, 
REPUBLIC, supra note 9. 
 12. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 363. 
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commentators agree that the APA has taken on quasi-constitutional status.13 Some 
have even dubbed the APA a superstatute under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory.14 
None, however, has taken on the task of demonstrating why the APA is a 
superstatute; nor have scholars explored the implications of that status. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that superstatutes are and should be interpreted 
dynamically and evolutively to grow and change over time.15 Hence, one might 
assume that dubbing the APA a superstatute would lend support to the scholars who 
applaud the courts’ continued development of administrative common law.16 
Applying superstatute theory to the APA, however, yields a surprising result because 
the APA differs from most other federal superstatutes in one important respect: no 
single agency is charged with its implementation. Single-agency implementation is 
not a requirement for superstatute status,17 but it is central to the assertion that 
superstatutes should be interpreted broadly and evolutively. That assertion is built on 
a civic-republican model of deliberation that necessitates public involvement in legal 
change. In the absence of direct public engagement through an election, Eskridge 
and Ferejohn’s model of deliberation puts a single agency at the center of an 
interpretive web, with the other branches of government and the public intertwined. 
Unlike most other superstatutes, however, agencies are not the primary interpreters 
of the APA—courts are. And courts are not deliberative in the civic-republican sense 
that superstatute theory demands to legitimize evolutive interpretation.18 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. See supra note 4. 
 14. E.g., Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5, 18 
(2009); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in 
Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2054 (2011); Frymer, supra note 9, at 
234; David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 675–76 (2005); John 
C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1816 n.151 (2003); Cass R. 
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 466 
(2015); see also Lawrence Solum, Gluck on Entrenched Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (April 1, 2013, 12:15 p.m.), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory
/2013/04/gluck-on-entrenched-canons-of-statutory-interpretation.html. 
 15. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 291, 293; Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1247, 1249. 
 16. E.g., DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 8, at §§ 2.17, 2.18, 6.37, 
7.19, 14.10; Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee 
Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3 [hereinafter Davis, Administrative Common Law]; JAFFE, 
supra note 8, at 327–29, 336–37, 372, 376; Gillian E. Metzger, Annual Review of 
Administrative Law—Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293, 1293 (2012); Scalia, supra note 12, at 382, 385–87; see also Emily S. Bremer, The 
Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1246 (2014) (stating that the 
scholarly literature “increasingly embraces the validity of administrative common law”). But see 
John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 115 (1998). 
 17. Eskridge and Ferejohn include “executive-legislative partnerships,” state statutes that 
reflect a consensus among states, and international agreements within the ambit of 
“superstatutes.” ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 7, 16, 212–13. 
 18. In asserting the normative superiority of deliberation that involves not just the parties 
to a particular court proceeding but the public and representative branches of government, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn join a long line of theorists, including Jeremy Waldron, Amy Gutmann, 
Dennis Thompson, and Mark Seidenfeld. See infra Part IV.A. 
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Eskridge and Ferejohn did not address superstatutes like the APA that are 
entrenched and quasi-constitutional but do not undergo the sort of civic-republican 
deliberation their theory requires to justify evolutive interpretation. I apply 
superstatute theory to this new category to discern how the APA should be 
interpreted.19 Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that judicial review of superstatutes should 
respect and encourage public deliberation. In the APA’s case, that means the courts 
should adhere more closely to the compromises encoded in the statute’s text and 
hesitate before moving too far towards the boundaries of the text’s possible meaning. 
Given the extraordinary legislative process that led to the APA’s enactment and the 
relative paucity of agency-based deliberative feedback since then, courts should be 
particularly chary of interpreting the APA’s text in a way that shifts the balance 
Congress reached through the political process. Courts should look more closely at 
the context and history of the APA’s individual provisions, including Congress’s 
treatment of each provision in the original legislative process and the quality of 
deliberation the provision has seen since enactment. 
If moving too far towards the boundaries of the APA’s text is problematic, then 
venturing beyond those boundaries altogether is even more troubling. The line 
between broad, evolutive interpretation of the APA and administrative common law 
is blurry, but there are many doctrines of administrative law that cross the line.20 My 
concern here is with those doctrines of administrative common law that contravene 
or simply ignore the APA, such as doctrines that give superdeference to certain 
agencies despite Congress’s deliberate decision to subject all agencies to the same 
standard of review; procedural requirements that exceed the APA’s minimal 
rulemaking provisions; and prudential ripeness doctrine, which conflicts with the 
APA’s promise of judicial review to any person who suffers a legal wrong and 
challenges final agency action.21 Scholars have long defended the courts’ journeys 
into the realm of administrative common law.22 Applying superstatute theory to the 
APA highlights a weakness in their defense. In the absence of deliberation that 
involves the public, administrative common law that ignores or contravenes the APA 
must be presumed to be illegitimate.23 
In Part I, I provide a brief introduction to administrative common law, and in Part 
II, I do the same for superstatute theory. In Part III, I demonstrate that the APA is a 
superstatute. Finally, in Part IV, I show that, although it is entrenched, the APA does 
not undergo the civic-republican style of deliberation that superstatute theory 
requires to justify evolutive interpretation. Although Eskridge and Ferejohn did not 
address this category of superstatutes, their theory nonetheless provides insight about 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. Whether any other superstatutes fall into this category is a subject for future inquiry. 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See supra note 16. 
 23. Superstatutes theory has its critics. E.g., Frymer, supra note 9, at 234–37; McCubbins 
& Rodriguez, supra note 9; Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/superstatutes (reviewing ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, 
REPUBLIC, supra note 9). That criticism does not undercut my reliance on the theory since I 
use it merely as a launchpad for discussion. Moreover, critics of superstatute theory are 
perhaps more likely to be critics of dynamic interpretation and administrative common law 
and thus reach the same destination as I do by a different route. 
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how the APA should be interpreted and leads to the conclusion that administrative 
common law that contradicts Congress’s intent faces significant legitimacy 
problems. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW 
Despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 
that “[t]here is no federal general common law,”24 federal common law persists. The 
Supreme Court has held that federal common law is permissible in a “few and 
restricted” areas “in which a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely 
federal interests, and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to 
develop substantive law.”25 Recognizing Congress’s “superior authority” in policy 
making and the judiciary’s “place in the constitutional scheme,”26 however, federal 
courts exercise caution in developing common law, even where its creation is 
authorized, such as in admiralty law.27 
Any attempt to discern where statutory interpretation ends and common law 
begins is challenging, since the two exist on a continuum.28 Like Gillian Metzger, I 
conceive of common law as judicial pronouncements that “venture too far afield from 
statutory text or discernible legislative purpose to count simply as statutory 
interpretation.”29 A text may be subject to many interpretations, depending on the 
interpreter’s approach. Common law exceeds the boundaries of any permissible 
interpretation.30 Thus, as John Duffy observed, “[T]he split between statutory and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 512 (2010) (“[T]he Erie principle has not 
governed in anything near such absolute form . . . .”). As Abbe Gluck points out, “The Erie rule 
itself is a federal common law doctrine.” Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory 
Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 798, 811 (2013). 
 25. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). How much room Erie leaves for federal common law is a 
matter of debate. See Gluck, supra note 24, at 809. 
 26. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 32 (1990). 
 27. See Thomas Field, Craig Allen Nard & John Duffy, Dickinson v. Zurko: An Amicus 
Brief, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 49, 71 (2000). 
 28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 367 (5th ed. 2007); Davis, 
Administrative Common Law, supra note 16, at 4; Metzger, supra note 16, at 1310–11. 
 29. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1295; see also Davis, Administrative Common Law, supra 
note 16, at 3 (“Common law is law that courts have created without interpreting a 
constitutional or statutory provision.”); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of 
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (defining “federal common law” as “any federal 
rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text—whether 
or not that rule can be described as the product of ‘interpretation’ in either a conventional or 
unconventional sense” (emphasis in original)). Others have used the term “administrative 
common law” to refer to “agency-developed interpretations of law.” Richard W. Murphy, 
Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 920 n.16 (2006). 
 30. See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that common law reflects “a degree of creativity beyond 
that expected of a court engaged in the construction and application of an authoritative text”); 
Duffy, supra note 16, at 115 (“Under the common-law method, a court decides a case without 
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common-law approaches in administrative law” is not a “disagreement[] about how 
to interpret the APA, but whether to interpret the APA.”31 
Administrative law is infused with common law.32 Some provisions of the APA 
carve out space for common law, like the savings clause that permits the courts to 
continue to employ equitable doctrines in fashioning remedies.33 But the Act does 
not delegate broad authority to the courts to develop administrative common law. 
Section 559 of the APA provides that the Act does not “limit or repeal additional 
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”34 The Supreme 
Court held in Dickinson v. Zurko that section 559 did not preserve the courts’ ability 
to continue to fashion administrative common law, but merely “grandfathered 
common-law variations” that were clearly established when the APA was enacted.35 
Some provisions of the APA leave room for, and indeed are so indefinite as to 
invite, judicial elaboration. The terms “arbitrary” and “capricious” in section 706’s 
standard of review, for example, might provide a springboard for requiring agencies 
to evaluate “relevant data” and disregard factors that Congress did not intend for the 
agency to consider.36 Other provisions are more definite. Section 704 requires 
exhaustion of administrative remedies “only when expressly required by statute or 
when an agency rule requires appeal before review and the administrative action is 
made inoperative pending that review.”37 
My concern is with common law that contradicts or ignores the APA.38 Several 
examples will help to frame my argument. I have previously demonstrated that in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
guidance from any textual codification of law and policy.”). 
 31. Duffy, supra note 16, at 181 (emphasis in original). 
 32. Davis, Administrative Common Law, supra note 16, at 3; Duffy, supra note 16, at 
117; Metzger, supra note 16, at 1311; Metzger, supra note 24, at 508; Symposium, Present at 
the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 526 (1986) (Kenneth 
Culp Davis observing that the bulk of administrative law is common law). Professor Duffy 
explains some of the reasons for administrative common law’s staying power. Duffy, supra 
note 16, at 119, 130–38. 
 33. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“Nothing herein . . . affects . . . the power or duty of the 
court to . . . deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .”); see also 
Duffy, supra note 16, at 128; Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and 
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003). 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012). 
 35. 527 U.S. 150, 155, 161 (1999). Even the dissenting justices agreed with that 
interpretation of § 559. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 882 (“Hard-look 
review may or may not be a correct or even plausible interpretation of § 706(2)(A).”); Metzger, 
supra note 24, at 491 (“Over the years . . . the courts came to read arbitrary and capricious in 
an increasingly rigorous fashion until it came to embody today’s hard look review.”); cf. 
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1118–21, 
1134 (2009) (arguing that judicial review under the arbitrary or capricious standard can be 
adjusted to respond to emergency circumstances). 
 37. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993) (emphasis in original) (discussing 5 
U.S.C. § 704 (1992)). 
 38. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 
600–03 (2011) [hereinafter Kovacs, Leveling]; see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 
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APA, Congress deliberately subjected all agencies to the same standard of review—
the deferential arbitrary or capricious standard—and declined the War Department’s 
request that the military be exempted from the bill altogether.39 Yet the courts give 
the military more deference than other agencies.40 Broad application of a common-
law superdeference standard to the military is unjustified, because the APA’s 
exception for “military authority exercised in the field in time of war” insulates core 
military functions from judicial review.41 That exception obviates 
separation-of-powers concerns with judicial review of military action, leaving only 
a common law rule that contradicts Congress’s considered judgment.42 
John Duffy showed that “ripeness doctrine has no place in the APA.”43 The APA 
provides that if a person is “suffering legal wrong” or is “adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action” and is challenging “final agency action for which there 
is no adequate remedy in a court,” that person is entitled to judicial review.44 
Prudential ripeness doctrine, in contrast, balances “the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.”45 Although the Court recognized that the APA cabins exhaustion 
doctrine,46 it continues to apply common law ripeness doctrine even though, as 
Professor Duffy pointed out, “[T]he APA does not authorize balancing.”47 
                                                                                                                 
 
131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (explaining that the need for federal common law disappears 
when Congress enacts a statute addressing the question directly). 
 39. Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38; Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military 
Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 697, 700–01 
(2010) [hereinafter Kovacs, A History]. I employ the arbitrary or capricious standard as a 
catchall for the various standards set forth in § 706(2), as others have before me. See Indep. 
Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1248 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 
683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Beermann, supra note 30, at 24 (“The catchall standard that governs 
judicial review of agency action, which applies to most cases not involving formal agency 
adjudication, is the arbitrary and capricious test . . . .”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Super 
Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 733, 740 (2011) (“[S]ubsection (A) serves as a catch-all standard that generally 
applies . . . to review of informal adjudication and rulemaking.”); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial 
Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 
TULSA L.J. 221, 232 n.70, 233 (1996). 
 40. Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 591–99. 
 41. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(g) (2012).  
 42. Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 616–23. But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1001–03 (2013) 
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (empirical study showing that congressional drafters 
may intend to delegate different levels of interpretive authority to different agencies); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 
753–54 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II] (discussing those results). 
 43. Duffy, supra note 16, at 162. 
 44. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012). 
 45. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). 
 46. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993). 
 47. Duffy, supra note 16, at 177; see also Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 
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Nicholas Bagley recently demonstrated that the presumption in favor of judicial 
review of agency action is common law.48 The Supreme Court grounded that 
presumption in the APA’s provisions authorizing any person “suffering legal wrong 
. . . or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action” to challenge “final agency 
action” in court.49 As Bagley pointed out, however, the APA only provides for 
judicial review “except to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.”50 
Thus, the APA does not establish a presumption; it “establishes a default rule 
favoring judicial review where no statute precludes it.”51 
Many scholars believe that Chevron doctrine52 is common law.53 The APA 
instructs that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.”54 Yet, 
the Court in Chevron held that, if the relevant statute is silent or ambiguous on a 
question before the court, the court should defer to the administering agency’s 
interpretation of the statute.55 In Chevron itself, the Court made no effort to reconcile 
its holding with the APA. Recently, the Court equated this part (step two) of the 
Chevron test with review under the APA’s arbitrary or capricious standard,56 but it 
has yet to explain how that meshes with the instruction that courts decide questions 
of law. Justice Scalia may have come closest in his dissent in United States v. Mead 
Corp., where he suggested that, if a statute is ambiguous, the only remaining question 
of law is “whether the agency’s interpretation had gone beyond the scope of 
discretion that the statutory ambiguity conferred.”57 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts, 
in his dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC, opined that, in applying Chevron, the Court 
gives “binding deference to permissible agency interpretations of statutory 
ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency the authority to interpret 
those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’ . . . Whether Congress has conferred such 
                                                                                                                 
 
538 U.S. 803 (2003); Beermann, supra note 30, at 20 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001)). The Supreme Court recently expressed some discomfort 
with prudential ripeness doctrine. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 
2347 (2014). The Court’s discomfort, however, seems limited to evaluating ripeness as a 
question of jurisdiction. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the 
Court did not abandon the zone-of-interest test for prudential standing entirely, but merely shifted 
the analysis from jurisdiction to the merits. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–90 (2014). The Court’s citation 
of Lexmark in Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2347, indicates that the Court may be 
contemplating shifting the ripeness analysis to the merits but not abandoning it altogether. 
 48. Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1320–21 (2014). 
 49. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1964)). 
 50. Bagley, supra note 48, at 1304 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012) (emphasis omitted)). 
 51. Id. at 1305. 
 52. Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 53. E.g., Beermann, supra note 30, at 21; Duffy, supra note 16, at 118, 189–99; Metzger, 
supra note 16, at 1300–01; see also Gluck, supra note 24, at 798, 801 (agreeing that Chevron 
is common law and arguing that other statutory interpretation tools are common law as well); 
Metzger, supra note 24, at 505–06 (characterizing Chevron as a “constitutionally inspired 
requirement[]” whose “constitutional underpinnings remain[] unspecified”). 
 54. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 55. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45. 
 56. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011). 
 57. 533 U.S. 218, 241 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1216 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1207 
 
power is the ‘relevant question[ ] of law’ that must be answered before affording 
Chevron deference.”58 But obviously those dissents do not speak for the Court. 
The Supreme Court explained in Vermont Yankee that the APA’s rulemaking 
provisions are basic, reflecting Congress’s intent to leave much of rulemaking 
procedure to agency discretion.59 Thus, when courts impose procedural requirements 
on rulemaking that exceed the APA’s minimal constraints, they may contravene 
congressional intent. For example, in Vermont Yankee, the Court held that the D.C. 
Circuit erred in requiring trial-type procedures in an informal rulemaking.60 Extant 
examples include the requirements that a final rule be a “logical outgrowth”61 of the 
proposed rule and that agencies provide public notice of the information they 
considered in formulating the rule,62 as well as the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that 
ex parte contacts in informal rulemakings be disclosed (to the extent that requirement 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Perhaps Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts read Peter Strauss’s article contending that 
Chevron merely expanded NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944): “In its first 
step, as in Hearst, a court will independently decide what authority has been conferred on an 
agency.” Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—the Courts in Administrative Law, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 818 (2008). Thus, “[t]he court’s independent conclusion of law might 
be that authority over some particular question of meaning . . . has been validly assigned to an 
administrative agency.” Id. John Duffy suggested that if Chevron deference were contingent 
on explicit statutory delegations of rulemaking authority, it could be reconciled with the text 
of the APA. Duffy, supra note 16, at 199–207. By that reasoning, Mead may have moved 
Chevron over the line from common law to statutory interpretation. See Thomas W. Merrill 
& Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 868–72 (2001) (arguing that 
Chevron doctrine is not common law but instead rests on congressional delegations of 
administrative authority). But see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 273, 279–88 (2011); Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 813 (2013). Interestingly, in their empirical study of 
congressional drafting, Gluck and Bressman found that Mead is more reflective of Congress’s 
actual practices than any other canon “except perhaps Chevron.” Gluck & Bressman, Part I, 
supra note 42, at 994; see also id. at 999. 
 59. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524, 545–46 (1978) 
(discussing legislative history). 
 60. Id. at 523–24. 
 61. See Beermann, supra note 30, at 8.  
 62. Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 245–46 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Portland Cement doctrine 
cannot be squared with the text of § 553 of the APA.”); Beermann, supra note 30, at 8; 
Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 892–99; see also Metzger, supra note 24, at 509 
(“[C]urrent requirements of notice and agency response to comments far exceed[] what the 
text of the APA suggests was originally expected.”); Scalia, supra note 12, at 380–81 & n.154. 
But see Jack M. Beermann, Rethinking Notice 2 (Boston U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 
13-49, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349716 
(“[T]here is a good instrumental case to be made against strict adherence to the text of the 
APA and in favor of requiring a new round of notice and comment when agencies make 
unanticipated changes to their proposals when promulgating final rules.”); Peter L. Strauss, 
Statutes That Are Not Static—The Case of the APA, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 767, 796–
98 (2005) (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act reshaped the meaning of the notice 
provisions in § 553). 
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survives)63 and its demand for open-mindedness in rulemaking.64 As this Article goes 
to press, the Supreme Court is poised to decide whether the D.C. Circuit erred in 
requiring the Department of Labor to go through notice and comment procedures 
before changing an interpretive rule even though the APA expressly exempts 
interpretive rules from the notice and comment provisions.65 While these common 
law requirements do not attempt to judicialize rulemaking to the extent that the D.C. 
Circuit did in Vermont Yankee, they nonetheless exceed section 553’s minimal 
provisions and may contradict Congress’s intent “that the discretion of the agencies 
and not that of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices 
should be employed.”66 
Perhaps administrative common law has survived because, as we get further away 
from 1946, the monumental legislative effort that went into enacting the APA almost 
seventy years ago becomes less salient to modern judges than concerns about 
procedural fairness in a growing administrative state.67 Regardless of the reason for 
its longevity, the courts are not open about their development of administrative 
common law, and they have not explained why it is permissible in some 
circumstances but not others, much less grappled with the constitutional concerns 
administrative common law raises.68 
While scholars have long endorsed administrative common law,69 Gillian Metzger 
provides its strongest defense. She argues that, because administrative common law 
is important, inevitable, and legitimate, the courts should acknowledge its existence 
and be more transparent about its employment.70 Even Metzger’s defense, however, 
cannot save administrative common law from the deliberative deficiency that 
superstatute theory reveals, as explained in Part IV. To set up that argument, I first 
describe superstatute theory, apply it to the APA, and explore the interpretive 
consequences of that exercise. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 885 (recognizing that the D.C. Circuit has 
narrowed, but “never expressly disavowed the doctrine”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1788 (2007) (“[T]he 
D.C. Circuit has vacillated as to whether a ban on ex parte communications in informal 
proceedings is consistent with Overton Park or at odds with Vermont Yankee.”). 
 64. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 889. 
 65. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 2820 (2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 14, 
at 432 (“[T]he Paralyzed Veterans rule is best seen as a form of federal common law . . . .”). 
 66. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978). 
 67. Beermann, supra note 30, at 27. 
 68. Id. at 2, 5, 29; Davis, Administrative Common Law, supra note 16, at 5–6; see also 
Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 600–02, 604. 
 69. See supra note 16. “Leading administrative law theorists in the post-New Deal period, 
like Professors Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis, openly celebrated administrative law’s 
common law character.” Metzger, supra note 16, at 1317. Jaffe and Davis’s endorsement of 
administrative common law “is understandable, for the decades in which they worked . . . 
marked the era of the ‘New Federal Common Law,’ so named by Judge Friendly’s famous 
1964 article.” Duffy, supra note 16, at 136. 
 70. Metzger, supra note 16. 
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II. ESKRIDGE AND FEREJOHN’S THEORY OF SUPERSTATUTES 
A. Identifying Superstatutes 
Others used the term “superstatute” before Eskridge and Ferejohn,71 but they 
are the only ones to have developed a theory of constitutional change centered on 
superstatutes.72 Eskridge and Ferejohn start from the premise that “[n]ot all statutes 
are created equal” and employ the term superstatute to represent those statutes that 
“successfully penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a deep way.”73 
Because they result from a public, deliberative process and survive efforts to dilute 
their central ideas, superstatutes take on a “normative gravity” that ordinary 
statutes do not attain.74 Status as a superstatute affects how the superstatute itself 
is and ought to be interpreted. These “quasi-constitutional” enactments also 
provide a “normative backdrop, influencing the way other statutes are read and 
applied,”75 and because superstatutes reflect deep deliberation and broad public 
support, they should also influence the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.76 
Eskridge and Ferejohn identify many federal superstatutes: the statute creating 
the Bank of the United States;77 the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. E.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 91 (1991); Eugene 
Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 65, 111 (1996); Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL. 
L. REV. 2121, 2141 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 
11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 142 (1994); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 770 n.266 (1988); Max Radin, The Myth 
of Magna Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1075 (1947). 
 72. Ackerman distinguished his thesis from Eskridge and Ferejohn’s superstatute theory: 
“I am concerned with landmark statutes that deserve full admission into the constitutional 
canon, while they deal with a broader class of super-statutes that deserve quasi-constitutional 
status of a lesser, but still very significant, kind.” Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1753 n.38 (2007) (emphasis in original). Superstatute theory has a 
broader conception of legal change than Ackerman advances insofar as superstatutes “acquire 
their normative force through a series of public confrontations and debates over time and not 
through a single stylized dramatic confrontation.” Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra 
note 9, at 1270; see also id. at 1271. 
 73. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1215; see also Eskridge, 
America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 6; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 
supra note 9. 
 74. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216; see also ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27. 
 75. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1265–66; see also ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 59. 
 76. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 39–40; see also 
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 6, 27, 102, 437–44. 
 77. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 
supra note 9, at 1223–25. 
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Rules Decision Act;78 the Civil Rights Acts of 186679 and 1871;80 the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890;81 the Federal Arbitration Act of 1926;82 the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932;83 many New Deal statutes, including the Securities 
Act of 1933,84 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,85 the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935,86 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938;87 the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938;88 the Civil Rights Act of 1964;89 the Voting Rights Act of 
1965;90 the Clean Air Act of 197091 and Clean Water Act of 1972;92 the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978;93 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,94 
among others. They also include “state statutory convergences,” like the married 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1223 n.22. 
 79. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 
(2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1225–26. 
 80. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)); see 
also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1225–26. 
 81. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); 
see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1231–32; ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 121. 
 82. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1260–61. 
 83. The Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 
(2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227. 
 84. The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77bbbb (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227. 
 85. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227. 
 86. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227. 
 87. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227. 
 88. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1257. 
 89. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1237; ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 88. 
 90. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra 
note 9, at 88, 117. 
 91. The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 301. 
 92. The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 
13 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 301. 
 93. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); see also Eskridge, America’s Statutory 
“constitution,” supra note 9, at 36. 
 94. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 58–59. 
1220 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1207 
 
women’s property laws and no-fault divorce,95 as well as international agreements, 
like the Geneva Conventions.96 
Under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory, superstatutes typically exhibit several 
characteristics. First, superstatutes “alter substantially the then-existing regulatory 
baselines with a new principle or policy.”97 They “seek[] to establish a new 
normative or institutional framework.”98 Second, a superstatute’s new principle 
“‘sticks’ in the public culture in a deep way, becoming foundational or axiomatic to 
our thinking.”99 It “prove[s] robust . . . over time.”100 Third, a superstatute has a 
“broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the 
statute.”101 A superstatute “will have colonizing effects on other statutes” and may 
have “a gravitational pull on constitutional law itself.”102 
Procedurally, a superstatute “emerges after a lengthy period of public discussion 
and official deliberation” and “passes the test of time.”103 In A Republic of Statutes, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn present a series of case studies of statutes that became 
entrenched superstatutes. Typically, the story begins with Congress’s statutory 
response to a broad “social movement.”104 Then the statute’s supporters and 
administrators implement the statute in a practical way that makes progress toward 
the statute’s goal and “avoid[s] the disasters predicted by opponents.”105 If the statute 
becomes “sufficiently valuable” to a growing segment of society, the statute will be 
consolidated when a new Congress reaffirms, and perhaps even expands, the original 
statute.106 Thus, the superstatute’s new principle is “debated, honed, and 
strengthened through an ongoing give-and-take among the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches.”107 Through this public, deliberative process, the statute “wins 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Id. at 16, 224, 244. 
 96. Id. at 16, 419. 
 97. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1230; see also ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 26; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 
9, at 1219. 
 98. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216. 
 99. Id. at 1231; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 26; Eskridge 
& Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216, 1230, 1273. 
 100. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1235–36; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 214–16; 
Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1240–42. 
 103. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1231, 1273; see also ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 26; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 
9, at 1237. 
 104. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 123; see also id. at 104–05. 
 105. Id. at 17; see also id. at 111, 121, 123, 166, 186. Eskridge and Ferejohn call this process 
of implementing a putative superstatute “administrative constitutionalism.” Id. at 26, 33, 186. 
They argue that administrative constitutionalism is “the dominant governmental mechanism for 
the evolution of America’s fundamental normative commitments.” Id. at 33; see also id. at 72–73, 
214, 266; cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013) 
(arguing for a broad conception of “administrative constitutionalism”). 
 106. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 17; see also id. at 105, 111, 123, 
166, 422. 
 107. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1237; see also ESKRIDGE 
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over skeptics,”108 and the new principle becomes “entrenched . . . into American 
public life.”109 Then “we’d say the law has become a superstatute.”110 Though 
superstatutes ultimately must yield to the Constitution, through extended public 
deliberation and evolution they acquire a “normative force”111 that makes them 
“resistant to change” and “gives them a power beyond their formal legal ambit.”112 
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that the evolution of public law through 
superstatutes, which they term “small ‘c’ constitutionalism,”113 is normatively 
superior to amendments of the large “C” Constitution.114 The “fundamental 
institutions and norms of our democracy” must be stable over time, adaptable to new 
circumstances, and legitimized through “popular deliberation.”115 Superstatutes meet 
those qualifications.116 They “provide[] a mechanism whereby a great principle can 
be recognized and entrenched, but the details worked out by experts and institutions” 
and then altered to respond to changing circumstances.117 The Constitution, on the 
other hand, is “too old to answer most of the looming social, political, and moral 
questions that Americans want answered”:118 it is too difficult to amend through the 
Article V process;119 it governs only government, not private, action;120 and it does 
not address the government’s duty “to create and guarantee affirmative and positive 
legal regimes” that give citizens “ample room to make the choices that fulfill their 
needs and desires.”121 
Eskridge and Ferejohn also posit that the law is better developed through 
superstatutes than through judicial constitutional interpretation.122 “[A] really 
thoughtful decision by nine unelected wise people is not as legitimate as a decision 
made by elected officials with popular input and the possibility of serious 
contestation afterwards.”123 The ongoing, dynamic, republican deliberation that 
superstatutes endure gives “more opportunities for meaningful public input” and thus 
is “more legitimate and . . . more productive” than judicial constitutional change.124 
Consequently, the Supreme Court’s greatest “Constitutional triumphs” have been in 
                                                                                                                 
 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 7, 19, 78, 454; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 
supra note 9, at 1273. 
 108. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 111.  
 109. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1237. 
 110. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 111. 
 111. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1270.  
 112. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 8; see also id. at 13, 27, 28, 64. 
 113. Id. at 1. 
 114. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1271–76; see also ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 8–9, 374. 
 115. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 44. 
 116. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 18; see also id. at 303. 
 117. Id. at 122; see also id. at 263, 334. 
 118. Id. at 4; see also id. at 37–38. 
 119. Id. at 4, 49–51, 73. 
 120. Id. at 4, 25–26. 
 121. Id. at 4–5, 22 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 9, 25, 42–48, 51–54, 91–95. 
 122. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1271–76. 
 123. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 35. 
 124. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 167; see also id. at 445. 
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cases where the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution paralleled norms that had 
already become entrenched in superstatutes.125 
B. Interpreting Superstatutes 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s work is focused on small “c” constitutional change and 
the process by which statutes become entrenched superstatutes. A related, but 
separate part of their theory concerns the interpretation of superstatutes. That part of 
their theory is not developed as fully but they provide ample material to feed a 
discussion of how the APA should be interpreted. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that superstatutes are and should be interpreted 
differently from ordinary statutes and more like the Constitution.126 Descriptively, 
they argue that, as superstatutes age, they often reach “beyond and even against the 
original congressional expectations.”127 This superstatutory evolution is inevitable, 
according to Eskridge and Ferejohn, for three reasons. First, superstatutes tend to be 
written using broad language because “they are aimed at big problems and must last 
a long time.”128 Even the agency’s initial application of the statute to specific 
circumstances “will typically go beyond the expectations, or even the imagination, 
of the enacting Congress.”129 Second, the agency officials who implement the statute 
have audiences, constituencies, perspectives, and ethical duties that differ from the 
statute’s authors in Congress, and those differences grow as time passes.130 Third, 
agencies are continually pressed to interpret the statute “to be responsive to new 
facts, new needs, [and] new ideas,” and “current rather than historical political 
preferences.”131 
Superstatutory interpretive evolution is normatively desirable, according to 
Eskridge and Ferejohn, because it is more adaptive than Constitutional change.132 
Hence, Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that both courts and agencies should interpret 
superstatutes in a purposive and dynamic fashion, applying the terms “broadly and 
evolutively”133 to implement “statutory purpose and principle as well as 
compromises suggested by statutory texts.”134 “Because they evolve, common-law 
style,” the interpretation of superstatutes should not be bound by Congress’s original 
intent to the same extent as ordinary statutes.135 Thus, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue 
that courts interpreting superstatutes should be attentive to Congress’s purposes, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Id. at 9; see also id. at 102, 350, 433. 
 126. See id. at 292. 
 127. Id. at 263; see also id. at 267. 
 128. Id. at 267. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 270. 
 131. Id. at 272–73. 
 132. Id. at 263, 303, 334; Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 
30–34. 
 133. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1249. 
 134. Id. at 1247; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 291, 293. Eskridge 
contends that a statute’s purpose changes over time as interpreters apply the statute to new 
circumstances. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 30–31 (1994). 
 135. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1252. 
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examine the statute’s ongoing legislative and administrative history, and give 
agencies room to change their interpretations.136 
At first glance, it looks like superstatute theory would support administrative 
common law. Yet, applying superstatute theory to the APA yields an unexpected 
result because the APA is not a typical superstatute. Typically, federal superstatutes 
are implemented and interpreted by a single agency; the APA is not.137 Single-agency 
implementation is not a requirement for a statute to become entrenched; “there are 
different paths toward entrenchment.”138 For example, state statutory convergences 
may become entrenched despite the lack of a single agency at the center of the 
interpretive universe. Nonetheless, single-agency implementation is central to 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s contention that superstatutes inevitably evolve and ought to 
evolve. That superstatutory evolution may be legitimized by an election. Absent such 
direct public engagement, however, Eskridge and Ferejohn ground the legitimacy of 
superstatutory evolution on single-agency implementation and interpretation with a 
strong connection to the public.139 
Eskridge and Ferejohn have not addressed statutes like the APA in their work on 
superstatutes, but superstatute theory provides a valuable tool for exploring how the 
APA should be interpreted. Applying the theory to the APA enhances superstatute 
theory as well by applying it to a new category of statutes. In the next Part, I 
demonstrate that the APA has the characteristics of a superstatute. 
III. THE APA IS A SUPERSTATUTE 
Although Eskridge and Ferejohn have not identified the APA as a superstatute, 
they have acknowledged its importance. Eskridge argued that statutes and 
regulations are “the primary source of constitutional structures, rules, and rights in 
our polity” and the APA provides the framework for much of that lawmaking.140 In 
their recent book, Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that “most legally binding rules” 
are generated by agencies pursuant to congressional delegations of lawmaking 
authority.141 The APA, therefore, provides the “framework for understanding most 
national lawmaking and much national adjudication.”142 
In this Part, I demonstrate that, like the Voting Rights Act, the APA is entrenched; 
it “propounded a bold new principle of law that was enthusiastically received in 
Congress, was aggressively implemented . . . , has been accepted by Americans of 
all political persuasions, and has been repeatedly reaffirmed by Congress.”143 We the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 293–302. In addition, 
interpreters should never forget the government’s “core meta-purposes,” like ensuring security 
and equality. See id. at 465–66. 
 137. See infra Part III.B. 
 138. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 115. 
 139. See infra Part III.A. 
 140. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 5, 12. 
 141. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 10. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 117. But see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invaliding 
coverage formula in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act). 
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people “have embraced [its] core principle, and any effort to upend it would be met 
with popular unease or outrage.”144 
This discussion lays the foundation for my argument that judicial interpretation of 
the APA should focus on public deliberation. But I should not have to work too hard 
to convince readers that the APA is a superstatute. As Adrian Vermeule pointed out, if 
you assembled one hundred legal scholars and asked them to list superstatutes, “[a] 
handful of statutes will appear on most lists—say, the Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946, which is in many respects the fundamental framework for the modern American 
regulatory state, yet which Eskridge and Ferejohn oddly mention only in passing.”145 
A. Emerged from a Long Period of Deliberation 
With the rise of the administrative state in the early twentieth century came the 
conservative drive for administrative reform.146 The American Bar Association 
(ABA) led the charge, voicing its concerns through its Special Committee on 
Administrative Law, which the ABA’s Executive Committee created in May 1933 
in response to the first New Deal.147 Over the years, the ABA’s Special Committee 
met, issued reports, and proposed legislation on numerous occasions.148 Before 1937, 
however, when the Supreme Court was keeping New Deal programs at bay,149 the 
ABA’s proposals gained no traction in Congress.150 In 1938, “[t]he decibel count 
rose markedly.”151 The Supreme Court had begun to uphold New Deal programs,152 
and although Democrats retained control of Congress, Republicans gained enough 
seats to strengthen their coalition with conservative Democrats in the drive for 
administrative reform.153 The Senate Judiciary Committee held eight days of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 117. 
 145. Vermeule, supra note 23. But see Ackerman, supra note 72, at 1750 (“The trouble 
comes when we compare the cases and landmark statutes on our lists. Mine might contain the 
Administrative Procedure Act, but yours might not.”); Frymer, supra note 9, at 234–35 
(suggesting that the APA might or might not appear on one’s list of superstatutes). 
 146. Paul Frymer contends that “almost all of the superstatues [Eskridge and Ferejohn] 
engage derived initially from progressive movements on the left.” Frymer, supra note 9, at 235. 
A notable exception is the Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. ch. 3 (2012)), which resulted from the pressure of corporate 
capitalists and bankers. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 335–39. 
 147. See Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 682. 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 679, 682, 684–85, 693–96; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1569–77, 
1582–83, 1588–94, 1639–40, 1644–47, 1649–50. 
 149. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (striking 
down the Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (invalidating regulations issued under the National Industrial Recovery Act).  
 150. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 681–83; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1569. 
 151. Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 
219, 221 (1986). 
 152. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the 
National Labor Relations Act); W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding 
minimum wage law for women and minors). 
 153. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 683–84; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1580–82, 1586. 
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hearings on an administrative courts proposal early that year.154 That bill died in 
committee.155 The ABA’s new proposal, introduced in Congress in 1939, came to be 
known as the Walter-Logan bill.156 
In an effort “to deflect the new momentum for strict control of agencies that the 
introduction of the ABA bill had sparked,” President Roosevelt instructed the 
Attorney General to form a committee to study administrative reform.157 The 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure included twelve 
practitioners, judges, and professors—eight New Deal supporters and four 
conservatives.158 The Attorney General’s Committee constructed an enormous 
record of current administrative practices and discussed potential legislative 
proposals.159 For each of twenty-seven federal agencies, the Committee staff 
interviewed agency officers and employees, as well as lawyers who practiced before 
the agency; drafted a monograph about the agency; solicited comments on the draft 
from the agency; and held public hearings.160 
Meanwhile, Congress debated the Walter-Logan bill extensively. A 
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on April 5, 1939.161 
The Senate debated the bill on June 13, 1939, and the issue “began to attract intense 
national attention.”162 The House debate spanned four days in April 1940, and the 
bill passed the House by a vote of 282 to 96.163 The Senate debated the bill again on 
November 19, 1940, and passed the bill with amendments by a vote of 27 to 25.164 
The House debated and concurred in the Senate amendments by a vote of 176 to 51 
on December 2, 1940.165 All in all, the floor debates leading to the passage of the 
Walter-Logan bill span more than one hundred pages in the Congressional Record.166 
President Roosevelt vetoed the Walter-Logan bill in part because he wanted to 
wait for the report of the Attorney General’s Committee “before approving any 
measure in this complicated field.”167 The House debated the bill again and fell 34 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1588–89. 
 155. Id. at 1588–90. 
 156. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 685. 
 157. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1594. 
 158. Id. at 1595. 
 159. See COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1941) [hereinafter AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 160. A.H. Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 
589–90 (1941); see also Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1596. The Committee’s staff included 
Walter Gellhorn and Kenneth Culp Davis. Id. at 1595. 
 161. Administrative Law: Hearings on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324 Before 
Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 19 (1939). 
 162. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1602; see also 84 CONG. REC. 7075–78 (1939). 
 163. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 688–89; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1606, 1619; 
see also 86 CONG. REC. 4742–44 (1940). 
 164. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1620–22; see also 86 CONG. REC. 13,747–48 (1940). 
 165. 86 CONG. REC. 13,815–16 (1940). 
 166. 84 CONG. REC. 7075–78 (1939); 86 CONG. REC. 4530–48, 4590–605, 4646–75, 
4722–44, 13,743–48, 13,807–16 (1940). 
 167. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The President Vetoes the Bill Regulating Administrative 
Agencies, Note to the House of Representatives, Dec. 18, 1940, in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 616, 620 (1941). 
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votes short of overriding the President’s veto.168 About a month later, the Attorney 
General’s Committee issued its 474-page report.169 The report described the history 
of administrative government and the organization and procedure of existing 
agencies; discussed rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial review; and included two 
draft bills: a liberal “majority bill” and a conservative “minority bill.”170 Both bills 
were introduced in the Senate.171 
In the spring and summer of 1941, the Senate Judiciary Committee held 
twenty-five days of hearings, producing a transcript of 1621 pages.172 The Committee 
heard from numerous agencies; members of the Attorney General’s Committee; the 
ABA and other bar associations; and groups representing business interests and 
administrative practitioners, professors, and labor interests, among others.173 Before 
Congress could take further action on administrative reform, war came, and other 
matters commanded Congress’s attention.174 
Congress returned to the task of administrative reform two weeks after D-Day in 
1944, when Senator McCarran and Representative Sumners introduced a bill that the 
ABA Committee had designed as a compromise between the Attorney General’s 
Committee’s majority and minority bills.175 McCarran and Sumners reintroduced a 
revised bill in the new Congress in 1945, and the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees proceeded in private through a series of closed-door negotiations with 
the Attorney General and private interests, including the ABA.176 The Senate 
Judiciary Committee solicited comments on its first revision of the bill and formally 
submitted its next draft to the Attorney General, who endorsed the bill, as did the 
ABA.177 The Committee passed the bill unanimously and issued a 31-page report 
interpreting each of the bill’s provisions.178 The House Judiciary Committee held 
three days of hearings in June 1945,179 reported the bill unanimously with minor 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1628, 1630. 
 169. AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159. 
 170. See id.; see also Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1632–36. 
 171. S. 675, 77th Cong. (1941); S. 674, 77th Cong. (1941); see also Shepherd, supra note 
3, at 1636. 
 172. Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before Subcomm. 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. (1941). 
 173. See id. 
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Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 693–96. 
 175. S. 2030, 78th Cong. (1944); H.R. 5081, 78th Cong. (1944); see also 68 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 256 (1943); Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1649–50. 
The bill was revised and reintroduced in January 1945. S. 7, 79th Cong. (1945); H.R. 1203, 
79th Cong. (1945). 
 176. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 696–97, 701; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1656, 1661. 
 177. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONG. 1944–46, at 11 (1946) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]; Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 699–700, 703; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 
1659, 1661–62. 
 178. See S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 
185; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1662. 
 179. See Federal Administrative Procedure: Hearings on H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R. 1117, 
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amendments, and issued a 48-page report.180 The bill passed the Senate and the 
House on voice votes that reportedly were unanimous,181 and President Truman 
signed the APA into law on June 11, 1946.182 
In sum, the APA of 1946 represented Congress’s response to a conservative 
movement and emerged from an enthusiastic Congress following years “of public 
discussion and official deliberation”183 within and between Congress, the Executive 
Branch, the ABA, and the public. The APA easily satisfies the first characteristic for 
superstatute status. 
B. Altered Regulatory Baselines 
For a statute to achieve superstatute status, it should have changed common law 
and regulatory baselines.184 This is a characteristic, however, and not a rigid criterion. 
An entire chapter of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s book is dedicated to the Sherman 
Act,185 which is a superstatute even though its “authors apparently thought they were 
federalizing the common law.”186 Statutory provisions that establish new law and 
those that restate existing law both may become so entrenched that they qualify as 
“super” within the meaning of superstatute theory. 
Some of the APA codified existing standards and practices.187 Even before the 
APA was enacted, some agencies began to change their procedures in response to 
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the growing interest in administrative reform,188 leading the Attorney General’s 
Committee to assert that “[i]n the best existing practices are embodied the 
fundamentals of fair administration.”189 That much of the Act codified existing law, 
however, does not detract from its status as a superstatute because the provisions that 
codified existing law are equally, if not more, entrenched than the provisions that 
created new law. Take, for example, the model of judicial review of agency action 
that parallels appellate court review of trial court judgments. Under the appellate 
review model, the court’s review is based on a record produced by the agency, the 
standard of review is based on “conventional understandings” of the relative 
competence of the court and the agency, and those understandings “are grounded in 
the law-fact distinction.”190 Professor Merrill showed that this model of judicial 
review already had been imported into administrative law before it was incorporated 
into the APA, and it is now “so deeply entrenched in American political culture that 
it is impossible to imagine wrenching free from its influence.”191 
In any event, many provisions of the APA were new.192 Certainly Congress would 
not have suffered with the Act for so many years merely to restate the common law. 
Members of Congress did not think that was all they had accomplished,193 and the 
Attorney General would not have needed to publish a manual advising agencies 
about complying with the new law194 if the new law were merely a restatement. In 
this Part, I highlight a few of the APA’s more obvious breaks with preexisting 
administrative law and practice.195 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 4, 62; JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE 
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 193. S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 193; 
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 194. See CLARK, supra note 187, at 6. 
 195. I leave for another day a discussion of which provisions of § 10 governing judicial 
review changed preexisting law. 
2015] ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW 1229 
 
One of Congress’s central goals in enacting the APA was to impose some 
uniformity on federal agencies.196 When Congress was considering the Walter-Logan 
bill, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees lamented the lack of uniformity in 
administrative procedure and judicial review of administrative actions.197 Two years 
later, in the final report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, both the liberal majority and the conservative minority recognized the need 
for more uniformity.198 When Congress returned to the task of administrative reform 
after the war, it reiterated its lament about the lack of uniformity in administrative law, 
but this time it followed through on its rhetoric.199 The Walter-Logan bill had included 
exemptions for numerous individual agencies, including the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.200 In 
the APA, Congress abandoned those exemptions. The Senate Judiciary Committee 
followed “the undeviating policy” of “deal[ing] with types of functions as such and in 
no case with administrative agencies by name.”201 The House followed the same path, 
explaining, “The bill is meant to be operative ‘across the board’ in accordance with its 
terms, or not at all. . . . No agency has been favored by special treatment.”202 Congress’s 
desire for greater uniformity is reflected in the Act itself, from the broad definitions of 
“agency,” “agency proceeding,” and “agency action,”203 to section 12’s direction that 
“all requirements or privileges relating to evidence or procedure” be applied equally to 
all agencies, and its provision that subsequent legislation could only “supersede or 
modify” the APA if it did so expressly.204 
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 204. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 12, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946) 
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After the APA’s passage, former adversaries agreed that the Act was designed to 
increase uniformity.205 Even the Attorney General agreed that the APA “sets a pattern 
designed to achieve relative uniformity in the administrative machinery of the 
Federal Government.”206 Within a few years, the Supreme Court joined the chorus 
in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, commenting that the Act was intended “to introduce 
greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among 
the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from each other.”207 The 
following year, in Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB, the Court reiterated that 
the APA reflected a desire for uniformity,208 and the Court has sustained the 
uniformity refrain.209 Of course, Congress itself has undermined its own effort to 
enhance uniformity by enacting numerous statutory overlays governing particular 
agencies.210 But the APA certainly broke with the past in establishing a uniform floor 
for administrative procedure and judicial review of administrative action.211 
Another way in which the APA altered regulatory baselines was in requiring 
agencies to publish their rules of organization and procedure. Prior to the APA, the 
Federal Register Act of 1935 required agencies to publish their substantive 
regulations in the Federal Register, but they were not required to formulate, much 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. Carl McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU 
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 22 (noting that “a very important purpose of the statute was to 
standardize and simplify”); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Procedure and the A.P.A., 24 
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 514, 514 (1949) (stating that the APA prescribed “[u]niform standards of 
fairness . . . for all federal administrative action”). 
 206. CLARK, supra note 187, at 5; see also id. at 9; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945); LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 177, at 224 (Letter from Attorney General Clark). 
 207. 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950). The Court supported this statement with citations to the House 
report on the APA, the Attorney General’s Committee report, and Carl McFarland’s statement at 
the NYU Institute, as well as the House and Senate reports and the House hearings on the 
Walter-Logan bill. Id. Congress overruled the Court’s holding that the APA governed deportation 
hearings “almost immediately afterward.” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991). 
 208. 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). 
 209. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (holding the APA governs review of 
Patent and Trademark Office findings of fact and allowing “grandfathered common-law 
variations” to persist based on ambiguous authority would undermine Congress’s intent to 
enhance uniformity in administrative law); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t 
of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1994) (holding that allowing 
agencies to devise their own rules governing the burden of proof in adjudications would 
undermine the APA’s goal of achieving greater uniformity in administrative practice); cf. 
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (indicating that 
allowing Supremacy Clause claim to proceed alongside APA claim might “threaten[] to defeat 
the uniformity that Congress intended by centralizing administration of the federal program in 
the agency and to make superfluous or to undermine traditional APA review”); Mayo Found. 
for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (applying Chevron 
deference to tax regulation). 
 210. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 196, at 344–46; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: 
Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996). The Environmental 
Protection Agency, for example, may impose some civil penalties without providing APA 
procedures. See William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal 
Procedures for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1993). 
 211. See MASHAW, supra note 187, at 289. 
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less publish, rules regarding their own organization or procedure,212 and few agencies 
did.213 The Attorney General’s Committee recommended that information 
concerning agency organization, policy statements, statutory interpretations, 
substantive regulations, rules of procedure, forms, and instructions “be made 
available, in orderly and readily accessible form, to the public.”214 Following through 
on that recommendation was one of the APA’s “basic purposes.”215 Section 3(a) of 
the Act, now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), required agencies to state and publish 
descriptions of their organization, including delegations of final authority; 
“statements of the general course and method by which [their] functions are 
channeled and determined”; and substantive rules, policy statements, and 
interpretations.216 Rules of organization and procedure that are not published as 
required by section 3 are not binding.217 Thus, section 3 required agencies “to take 
the initiative in informing the public” about how they operate.218 
Although agencies had become more proactive about publishing their rules as 
soon as the Attorney General’s Committee issued its report,219 the requirements of 
section 3 were new.220 Members of Congress felt that they were “among the most 
important and useful provisions of the bill.”221 Section 3 led agencies to assemble 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. Federal Register Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-220, § 5(a), 49 Stat. 500, 501 (codified at 
44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)(2) (2012)) (requiring publication of “documents or classes of documents 
that the President may determine from time to time have general applicability and legal effect”); 
see also AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 25–26, 225; David Reich, Administrative 
Procedure Act: Analysis of its Requirement as to Rule-Making, 33 A.B.A. J. 315, 316 (1947) 
[hereinafter Reich, Analysis]; David Reich, Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 495–96; Ashley Sellers, Administrative Procedure 
Act: Extent of Agency Compliance with Section 3, 33 A.B.A. J. 7, 7 (1947). 
 213. AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 26–27 (finding that few agencies issued 
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whole process”); see also id. at 226 (highlighting that “not a single important agency now 
discloses in practical form its own internal organization and set-up”). 
 214. Id. at 26. 
 215. CLARK, supra note 187, at 9; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 244–45. 
 216. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012)); see also Sellers, supra note 212, at 8. 
 217. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (“No person shall in any 
manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.”). 
 218. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 
235, 251; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 
187, 193. 
 219. See Nathanson, supra note 199, at 378. 
 220. Pat McCarran, Improving “Administrative Justice”: Hearings and Evidence; Scope 
of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A. J. 827, 830 (1946); see also Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action: 
The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J. POL’Y & HIST. 379, 
406–07 (2008); Sellers, supra note 212, at 7; The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: 
Codification or Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 676, 687, 703 (1947). 
 221. 92 CONG. REC. 5650 (1946) (statement of Rep. Francis Walter); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 235, 255; S. REP. 
NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 187, 198. 
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their rules in one place, analyze their practices, and state their requirements with 
more clarity and detail.222 When section 3 became operative on September 11, 1946, 
the Federal Register swelled from its usual length of thirty to sixty pages to almost 
1000 pages, despite the fact that many rules were not reprinted, but merely 
incorporated by reference to earlier publications.223 Thus, section 3’s publication 
requirements altered regulatory baselines. 
The APA’s “most important reform” may have been notice and comment 
rulemaking.224 Before the APA, statutes generally did not specify rulemaking 
procedures or require notice to interested parties.225 Some agencies consulted with 
interested parties in rulemaking nonetheless.226 But there were a “multitudinous 
variety of procedures” for promulgating regulations with “no unifying principle.”227 
The Attorney General’s Committee majority aimed to improve rulemaking “by 
emphasizing the importance of outside participation” in the process, but thought that 
such consultation should not be statutorily mandated.228 The minority, on the other 
hand, included in its proposed bill a provision requiring agencies to provide notice 
and some opportunity for public comment.229 The APA followed the minority’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 222. See Louis G. Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission, in NYU 
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 91; Robert E. Freer, An Analysis of Federal Trade Commission 
Procedures as They Relate to the Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra 
note 193, at 421. 
 223. Reich, Analysis, supra note 212, at 317; see also David Reich, Rule Making Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 497; Sellers, supra 
note 212, at 8. 
 224. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1583, 1635; see also, Present at the Creation: Regulatory 
Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 520. 
 225. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 102; Present at the Creation: 
Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 520. 
 226. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 103; MASHAW, supra note 187, at 
310 (noting that before the APA, some agencies informed the public of rules and guidelines 
and consulted with interested groups); see also CLARK, supra note 187, at 31 (explaining that 
federal agencies already “extensively employed” informal rulemaking procedures like 
“informal hearings (with or without a stenographic transcript), conferences, . . . submission of 
written views”); Louis G. Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission,  in NYU 
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 94; Roger S. Foster, Application of the Administrative Procedure 
Act to the Statutes Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in NYU 
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 214; W. Carroll Hunter, The Administrative Procedure Act in 
its Application to the Functions of the Department of Agriculture, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra 
note 193, at 377; Bradford Ross, Federal Power Commission Practice and Procedure as 
Affected by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 
180; John H. Wanner, Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act upon the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 119. 
 227. Feller, supra note 160, at 595. Although the case law at the time was similarly 
unsettled, Supreme Court decisions in the early 1940s suggested that “more procedural 
protection may need to be thrown around the rule-making process.” C. Herman Pritchett, The 
Supreme Court and Administrative Regulation, 1941–1944, 31 IOWA L. REV. 103, 111 (1945). 
 228. AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 6, 105. 
 229. Id. at 228. The minority’s proposed bill left to agency discretion the choice of whether to 
proceed with written comments, conferences, informal hearings, or formal hearings. Id. at 228–29. 
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recommendation.230 Section 4 of the Act, now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553, required 
agencies to publish in the Federal Register notice of proposed rulemakings and to 
“afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making.”231 That 
requirement altered regulatory baselines.232 
Another of the APA’s reforms was section 5(c)’s requirement, now codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 554(d), that agencies separate the functions of investigators and prosecutors 
from adjudicators.233 The Supreme Court observed in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath 
that the APA arose from a concern that administrative adjudications could be biased 
and arbitrary.234 Merging functions created an “unwholesome atmosphere” for 
adjudicating private rights and “weaken[ed] public confidence” in the fairness of 
agency decision making.235 Before the APA, agencies varied in their adjudication 
procedures and internal structures.236 Some agencies began to shift toward greater 
separation of functions in response to the Attorney General’s Committee’s 
investigation.237 But the Committee was unanimous in its belief that “this evil” 
persisted.238 Section 5(c) of the APA allowed hearing officers to remain in their 
agencies, but required them be functionally independent of investigators and 
prosecutors.239 The Attorney General’s Manual advised that officers who perform 
adjudicating functions should be housed in different units of agencies “to achieve 
fairness and independence in the hearing process.”240 Section 5(c) may have been 
“[o]ne of the most fundamental changes brought about by the Act.”241 
                                                                                                                 
 
 230. Nathanson, supra note 199, at 382; see also Present at the Creation: Regulatory 
Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 514, 518, 520. 
 231. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 4(a)–(b), 60 Stat. 237, 239 
(1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)); see also CLARK, supra note 187, at 26. 
 232. See The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, supra note 
220, at 675–76, 703; Ashley Sellers, “Informal” Dispositions Under the Administrative 
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 233. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(c) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012)). 
 234. 339 U.S. 33, 37–39 (1950). 
 235. Id. at 42. 
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 237. See Nathanson, supra note 236, at 911–12, 915–16, 934. 
 238. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 44; see also AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, 
at 45; Feller, supra note 160, at 601. 
 239. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 5(c), 60 Stat. 237, 240 (1946) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 262; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 203. 
 240. CLARK, supra note 187, at 54–56; see also Grisinger, supra note 220, at 405. 
 241. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, supra note 220, 
at 691, 703; see also Ashley Sellers, Adjudication by Federal Agencies Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 529 (observing that the 
separation of functions requirement in § 5(c) was an “age-old maxim of good government,” 
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In the very least, the APA’s passage meant that agencies were no longer guided 
solely by “common law standards, existing case law, and individual agency 
statutes.”242 As Jerry Mashaw observed, “A common law model based on private law 
traditions has been replaced by a regime of public law official accountability. This 
was and is a major revolution in our administrative constitution’s vision of the 
relationship of administration to legal rights.”243 In sum, while some of the APA 
codified existing law, many of its provisions established new law, thus demonstrating 
this characteristic of superstatutes. 
C. Passed the Test of Time 
The APA fits comfortably in the model of superstatutes insofar as it has passed 
the test of time.244 Many scholars have commented on the APA’s endurance.245 
Congress has reaffirmed and expanded the 1946 Act. Later Congresses advanced 
the enacting Congress’s project of making agencies more transparent to the 
public246 by adding public information and open meeting requirements to section 
3 of the Act.247 In 1976, Congress furthered the enacting Congress’s goal of making 
hearing officers fair and independent248 by adding a prohibition on ex parte 
communications in formal proceedings.249 The addition of a waiver of sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 
but possibly a “brand-new law, for, curiously enough, court decisions recognizing the rule are 
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 242. Grisinger, supra note 220, at 408; see also Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, 
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“a vision of negative liberty.” Id. 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 103. 
 245. E.g., William H. Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 235, 237 (1986); Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 869 n.81; Levy & Glicksman, 
supra note 242, at 508–09; Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra 
note 32, at 510; Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389, 
1391 (1996); see also Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish For: Amending the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2004) (arguing the APA has 
survived “because courts found ample flexibility in the APA’s terms”). 
 246. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 247. Freedom of Information Act, ch. 324, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §552 (2012)); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 
Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012)). 
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 233–241. 
 249. Government in Sunshine Act § 4 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2012)). 
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immunity to section 10 in 1976250 bolstered the enacting Congress’s desire “to 
afford a remedy for every legal wrong.”251 
Congress has also resisted efforts to upset the original legislative compromise by 
further restricting agencies. In the 1950s and 60s, the ABA advanced proposals to, 
among other things, create a presumption in favor of formal rulemaking, conform the 
rules governing such proceedings to those of the federal courts, hinder agencies from 
overruling hearing examiners’ decisions, and intensify judicial review.252 The 
“regulatory reform” efforts of the 1970s and 80s would have required de novo 
judicial review of all questions of law without deference and cost-benefit analysis of 
certain proposed rules.253 Cost-benefit analysis reappeared in the “Contract with 
America” in the mid-1990s.254 Current proposals would require formal rulemaking 
procedures and congressional approval for rules that would have a significant 
economic impact.255 These efforts to rebalance the agreement codified in the 1946 
Act have spurred “prolonged and serious” debate256 and generated congressional 
reports and hearing transcripts far too numerous to list here.257 To date, however, all 
of these efforts have failed.258 
D. Affected the Law Broadly 
The APA has had a strong gravitational pull on the law, influencing the design 
and interpretation of other statutes and the Constitution itself.259 The Act has had 
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 259. See supra text accompanying notes 74–76, 101–102, 112. 
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“colonizing effects on other statutes.”260 The APA’s requirement for public notice 
and comment in rulemaking, for example, is repeated throughout the U.S. Code,261 
as is the arbitrary or capricious standard.262 The Act also has guided the courts’ 
interpretation of other statutes. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has long turned to APA 
case law when applying the arbitrary or capricious standard in the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act.263 
More importantly, the APA has taken on the normative gravity that characterizes 
a superstatute.264 Gillian Metzger demonstrated that constitutional values infuse 
administrative law and, conversely, “ordinary administrative schemes and 
requirements . . . can inform judicial understandings of what the Constitution 
requires.”265 Due process provides an apt example. The loyalty boards of the late 
1940s led to the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Bailey v. Richardson that due process did 
not protect a federal employee who was fired for being disloyal because she had no 
property interest in her employment.266 Even if she had a property interest, the court 
continued, due process would not entitle her to “specificity in charges equivalent to 
that of valid criminal charges, confrontation by witnesses, cross examination of them, 
and hearing upon evidence openly submitted.”267 That state of affairs did not last 
long. As Joanna Grisinger observed, “the APA’s clear statement of administrative 
norms—some of which exceeded constitutional requirements—gave American 
lawyers a yardstick against which to measure the procedures of the loyalty 
program.”268 If it applied in Bailey’s case, the APA would have required the 
procedures she desired,269 and the Act soon became “a standard of due process 
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 264. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27. 
 265. Metzger, supra note 24, at 484–85, 507; see also Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes 
Interpret the Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 297 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org
/forum/how-statutes-interpret-the-constitution (arguing that superstatutes are interpretations 
of the Constitution itself). 
 266. 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 
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 267. Id. at 59. 
 268. GRISINGER, supra note 188, at 107. 
 269. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2012) (requiring notice of “the matters of fact and law asserted”); 
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against which other government procedures might struggle to be justified.”270 By 
1961, the Supreme Court had changed course and held that what procedures due 
process requires turns on the “nature of the government function involved” and the 
“private interest that has been affected by governmental action.”271 
In sum, the APA bears all the hallmarks of a superstatute. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE APA’S INTERPRETATION 
Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that superstatutes are and should be interpreted 
broadly and evolutively, potentially exceeding congressional intent.272 That 
contention, however, is premised on a public deliberative process that the APA does 
not follow. Eskridge and Ferejohn did not discuss superstatutes like the APA whose 
interpretation Congress did not delegate to any particular agency. Nonetheless, their 
work indicates that courts should hesitate before stretching the terms of the APA. 
Instead, courts should focus their review on the history of the Act, both before and 
after its enactment, paying particular attention to the legislative compromises 
encoded in the Act and any public deliberation it has encountered since 1946. 
Applying superstatute theory to the APA does more than demonstrate why 
stretching the statute’s terms is problematic, however; it also shows why 
administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA is particularly 
troubling. The problem with administrative common law is not just that common law 
is created by countermajoritarian courts; the problem is that, unlike other statutes, 
there is no agency that administers the APA and engages in an ongoing dialogue with 
the President, Congress, the courts, and the public. Thus, even if administrative 
common law can satisfy separation-of-powers and political-accountability concerns, 
it still raises public deliberation concerns. 
A. The Role of Deliberation in Superstatute Theory 
What legitimizes interpreting superstatutes so that they evolve over time, even to 
the point of exceeding the enacting Congress’s expectations? Deliberation. In 
superstatute theory, deliberation not only leads to entrenchment (that is, it makes 
some statutes super), but it also legitimizes evolutive interpretation of superstatutes. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn propound a civic-republican model of deliberation that 
requires feedback from the public.273 Sometimes the public gives feedback in 
elections. For example, Eskridge and Ferejohn assert that the election of national 
leaders who endorsed the Justice Department’s interpretation of the Sherman Act 
legitimized the Department’s departure from Congress’s original statutory intent.274 
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1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1429 (2000) (“The demise of the rights/privileges 
distinction resulted from the rise of the participatory ideal of policy making.”). 
 271. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
 272. See supra Part II.B. 
 273. E.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 78. 
 274. See id. at 162–63. 
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The state statutory convergence of married women’s property laws arose through 
“legislatures directly accountable to citizens.”275 
Even without direct public involvement, however, Eskridge and Ferejohn assert 
that superstatutory evolution is legitimate if the interpretive exercise is connected to 
the public through an implementing agency. Congress must have delegated 
interpretive authority to the agency: “When Congress adopts an ambitious statute and 
delegates enforcement authority (as it must) to executive and judicial officers, 
Congress ought to expect a dynamic application of the statute . . . .”276 But that 
delegation, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify agency-led interpretive 
evolution of superstatutes. The best way to legitimize an agency’s dynamic 
interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn say, is congressional ratification, such as 
Congress’s endorsement of the Interior Department’s interpretation of the Endangered 
Species Act in the 1982 amendments.277 In the absence of ratification, the agency bears 
a greater burden of securing “grassroots support from some other source, including 
direct appeals to We the People, Ourselves.”278 Ultimately, “public deliberation” is “the 
most plausible mechanism for legitimating dynamic agency interpretations.”279 
“Deliberation” in superstatute theory typically involves agency implementation 
and public input in a feedback loop.280 First the legislature, responding to popular 
will, enacts a statute and delegates its implementation to an agency. The agency plays 
a “primary role,” “work[ing] with affected groups to devise a workable 
implementation.”281 The public makes its views known to Congress and to the 
agency.282 Within the agency, the ideal model for public feedback is rulemaking, in 
which the agency gives public notice of its proposal, receives and seriously considers 
public comments, and publishes an explanation for its decision that is “cogently tied 
to congressional purposes.”283 Finally, “legislators reaffirm and expand upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. Id. at 213; see also id. at 225, 238. 
 276. Id. at 160; see also id. at 269 (arguing Congress’s delegation of authority to agencies 
to interpret a broad statutory term made the agencies’ “purposive expansion of the statute 
beyond, and probably against, original congressional expectations . . . not only likely but also 
legitimate”). Expansive application of the Clean Water Act was legitimate because Congress 
delegated to EPA and the Corps authority to interpret the statute’s broad terms. Id. at 269. 
 277. Id. at 274, 297. 
 278. Id. at 264; see also id. at 289 (arguing dynamic interpretation of superstatutes “ought 
to be publicly justified and debated, at least through agency rule making and perhaps through 
formal congressional action”). 
 279. Id. at 161. 
 280. See id. at 19, 105. 
 281. Id. at 23, 26; see also Stephen M. Griffin, The National Security Constitution and the 
Bush Administration, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 367 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org
/forum/the-national-security-constitution-and-the-bush-administration (observing that 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s model of administrative constitutionalism “does not appear to allow 
for” the possibility that the President could initiate small “c” constitutional change via, for 
example, the Commander-in-Chief power). 
 282. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 23, 26.   
 283. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 37; see also infra text 
accompanying note 368. Agencies may trigger public feedback in other ways. The Justice 
Department’s interpretation of the Sherman Act, for example, has been propounded and 
debated in amicus briefs, law review articles, empirical studies, policy papers, and 
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statutory scheme.”284 This model of deliberation incorporates administrative-law 
values like public participation, reason-giving, and transparency; central to this 
model is “feedback” directly from “We the People,” as well as from experts, 
regulated entities, and critics.285 
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that this type of agency-centered deliberation has 
“dual virtues”: it improves the quality of public policy and provides legitimacy.286 
For deliberation to have “legitimating value,” it must have three “key features.”287 
First, it must respond to both the deep and the urgent needs of “We the People.”288 
Second, it must continue with executive agencies typically taking the lead and 
Congress and the courts providing input.289 Third, it requires “feedback from outside 
the government.”290 It is the “strong connection to the people and popular needs” that 
legitimizes evolutive interpretation of superstatutes.291 Eskridge and Ferejohn 
                                                                                                                 
 
“presidential jawboning that the American consumer paid lower prices because government 
policy was protecting, but not overprotecting, the free market.” ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, 
REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 158. 
 284. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 23; see also id. at 14. A classic 
example of this feedback loop is the Endangered Species Act. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1531 (2012)). Congress delegated to the 
Department of the Interior the authority to interpret the Act. The Department issued a regulation 
interpreting the Act’s ban on “harming” listed species as including destruction of the species’ 
habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2015). When Congress amended the Act in 1982, it ratified that broad 
interpretation. Endangered Soecies Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Statl 1411 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see also id. at 274, 296–97. 
 285. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original). The judiciary also plays a role in integrating the statute 
“into the nation’s other normative commitments” and monitoring agencies. Id. Emily 
Hammond points out that agencies and courts engage in dialogue, particularly in the course of 
serial litigation. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011). See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Dialogue, 
Deferred and Differentiated, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 185 (2012). Gluck and Bressman’s 
recent empirical research, however, throws into doubt the traditional assumption that the 
courts and Congress communicate with each other effectively. See Bressman & Gluck, Part 
II, supra note 42, at 765–77. Instead, Gluck and Bressman “paint a picture of legislative 
staffers in a primary interpretive conversation with agencies, not with courts.” Id. at 728 
(emphasis in original); see also id. at 765, 767, 776–77. 
 286. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 158; see also id. at 27, 103. In 
construing deliberation as “a means by which opponents are brought around to agreement,” 
Eskridge and Ferejohn go beyond “the modern normative literature of deliberation” to 
“something more nuanced and novel.” McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 389–90. In 
conceiving of deliberation as a means of improving the quality of public policy, Eskridge and 
Ferejohn answered Lisa Schultz Bressman’s call for scholarship that treats prevention of arbitrary 
agency action as central to both “good regulatory government” and “legitimate regulatory 
government.” Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 494 (2003) (emphasis in original). 
 287. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27, 103–04 (emphasis in 
original). 
 288. Id. at 103.  
 289. Id. at 103–04.  
 290. Id. at 104. 
 291. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1276; see also Griffin, supra 
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propound a “broadly ambitious notion of deliberation” as “a mechanism of sharing 
assumptions, debating basic norms, grappling with matters of implementation, and 
changing hearts and minds.”292 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s entire theory is built on the normative superiority of 
deliberation that involves the public and representative branches of government 
rather than just the parties to a particular case and unelected judges. The process by 
which a statute becomes entrenched and that justifies evolutive interpretation of 
superstatutes involves Congress, agencies, and the public coming to a consensus, not 
simply the courts making pronouncements. The version of republican deliberation 
Eskridge and Ferejohn espouse is “accountable to stakeholders”; that accountability is 
strongest for members of the House of Representatives and weakest for judges who 
“do not face the voters at all.”293 Thus, although many administrative common law 
doctrines reflect ongoing dialogue between the federal courts (particularly the D.C. 
                                                                                                                 
 
note 281, at 384 (explaining that superstatute theory “depend[s] upon extensive public 
deliberation to ensure that the constitutional changes that [it] describe[s] are accepted as 
authoritative”). Scholars have questioned the value of administrative deliberation generally. 
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a 
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1703–19 (2012); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of 
Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 
1426–35, 1444 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics]; Jonathan Weinberg, The 
Right To Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 178–90 (2012). But see Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1511 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification] (arguing that civic 
republican theory justifies giving agencies broad policymaking authority and that agencies are 
the best hope for achieving the civic republican deliberative government ideal); Seidenfeld, 
The Role of Politics, supra, at 1445–57 (endorsing agency staff-based deliberation coupled 
with judicial review). If administrative deliberation generally falls short of superstatute 
theory’s ideal, then Eskridge and Ferejohn’s reliance on it may be unjustified. That inquiry is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 292. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 394. McCubbins and Rodriguez protest that 
that kind of deliberation only exists in rare circumstances and, generally, deliberation merely 
yields compromise. Id. at 390–94; see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9 (2006). 
The evolutive administrative interpretation of superstatutes that Eskridge and Ferejohn 
advocate, however, may undermine compromises that emerged from the original deliberative 
legislative process and that became encoded in the superstatute itself. Hence, there is a 
fundamental tension between entrenchment through deliberation and dynamic agency 
interpretation over time. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 395–97. McCubbins and 
Rodriguez suggest that that tension can be resolved either by viewing agency discretion as 
inevitable given “the need for flexibility” in public policy or by recognizing that Congress 
designs superstatutes to enable that sort of administrative updating. Id. at 397–98. Eskridge 
and Ferejohn espouse both resolutions. They clearly see broad administrative discretion in 
implementing superstatutes as necessary and inevitable, but their underlying assumption is 
that Congress has delegated to the agency the authority to issue binding interpretations of the 
superstatute. See supra text accompanying notes 276, 281–283. Professor Eskridge made this 
point more explicitly in prior work. ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 112–16; see also William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2008) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Vetogates]. 
 293. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 15 (emphasis omitted). 
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Circuit294) and the legal community, that sort of engagement does not satisfy Eskridge 
and Ferejohn’s call for a civic-republican type of deliberation that engages the public. 
This aspect of superstatute theory has a long pedigree. “In its most general form, 
the demand for deliberation has been a familiar theme in the American constitutional 
tradition. It is integral to the ideal of republican government as the Founders 
understood it.”295 More recently, Jeremy Waldron explained why judicial 
deliberation falls short of the republican ideal. He asserted that political disagreement 
is inevitable. Thus, for a decision to be authoritative, it is not sufficient for the 
decision to be “right.” Instead, the decision must result from a fair process.296 
Majority rule inevitably leaves some people subject to laws they think are unjust, but 
it is fair insofar as it gives “equal weight to each person’s view.”297 Courts also reach 
results some people believe are unjust, but they have  
one legitimacy-related defect that popular majoritarianism does not have: 
they do not allow a voice and a vote in a final decision-procedure to every 
citizen of the society; instead they proceed to make final decisions about 
the rights of millions on the basis of the voices and votes of a few.298  
Thus, Waldron called it “something of an insult” to relegate the resolution of 
disagreements to a handful of judges who, like a legislature, will often disagree 
among themselves and, like a legislature, will resolve their own disagreements by a 
majority vote.299 If disagreements are to be settled by “counting heads,” then it should 
be the heads of the citizens’ accountable representatives that are counted.300 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson also question the superiority of judicial 
deliberation. That supposed superiority is premised on the assumptions that 
legislators, because they must stand for election, will necessarily reflect the 
preferences of their constituents, while judges “will have more regard for 
well-reasoned principles.”301 Gutmann and Thompson challenge those assumptions, 
pointing out that because legislators “must defend their policies to many different 
groups,” they are “forced to formulate generally acceptable policies, and justify them 
by general principles.”302 Judges, in contrast, decide particular cases, hearing only 
from the citizens that appear as parties to the case and thus often pronounce narrow 
principles without considering the “larger social implications of their decisions.”303 
                                                                                                                 
 
 294. The D.C. Circuit is “the nation's premier administrative law court,” Jean Galbraith 
& David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 758 (2014), 
because it has exclusive jurisdiction over many administrative law matters and concurrent 
jurisdiction over most others. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? 
A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 389 (2006). 
 295. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 12 (1996). 
 296. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 213, 253 (1999). 
 297. Id. at 114 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 247. 
 298. Id. at 299. 
 299. Id. at 15. 
 300. Id. at 15, 90–91; see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 126–29 
(1999). 
 301. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 295, at 45. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
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Mark Seidenfeld agrees that courts are “necessarily reactive,” are not “designed to 
develop a consensus about the public good,” and “are too far removed from the voice 
of the citizenry” to ensure that their policies will be generally acceptable.304 
Eskridge and Ferejohn echo these refrains. To them, the Supreme Court is not an 
“exemplary deliberative body.”305 Judicial deliberation “values detachment from 
politics, principled reasoning from uncontested premises, and case-by-case 
incrementalism.” In a democracy, however, “deliberation should be politically 
engaged as well as rational, should be forward-looking and openly normative as well 
as principled, and should engage in wholesale and not just retail rule making.”306 
Judicial review’s proper role is in checking interpretations that exceed legislative 
authorizations or “fall athwart larger normative commitments.”307 It is not the role of 
the courts to ignore or countermand the results of republican deliberation. 
B. The Lack of Agency-Centered Deliberation in the APA 
Although the APA is an entrenched superstatute, it does not have the same 
lifecycle as other superstatutes. Perhaps the closest analogies Eskridge and Ferejohn 
discuss are the state statutory convergences in the family law arena. Like the APA, 
the married women’s property laws and no-fault divorce laws became entrenched 
without a single agency at the center of the interpretive universe. But that analogy 
does not justify evolutive interpretation of the APA “beyond and even against the 
original congressional expectations.”308 In their chapter from A Republic of Statutes 
discussing state family law, Eskridge and Ferejohn do not allege that the individual 
state statutes that make up a superstatutory convergence should be interpreted 
evolutively; rather they focus on the process by which the norm in a series of similar 
state statutes can become entrenched through state legislative action and periodic 
elections, ultimately leading to a convergence across states.309 The connection to the 
public in that model is through elections. Similarly, Eskridge and Ferejohn assert that 
the election of national leaders who endorsed the Justice Department’s new, 
evolutive interpretation of the Sherman Act justified exceeding the enacting 
Congress’s intent.310 Unlike the state family law convergences and the Sherman Act, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 304. Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 291, at 1542–43. 
 305. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 21. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 24; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A 
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies To 
Interpret Statutes, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 411 (2013) (arguing that agencies are superior to courts 
in statutory interpretation, but courts play an important role in monitoring agency dysfunction). 
 308. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 263, 267. 
 309. See id. at 213, 225, 238. This focus is not surprising, since superstatute theory is 
primarily a theory of small “c” constitutional change. 
 310. Id. at 162–63. “The primary purpose of antitrust law has changed in the past century 
—from protection of diffused industry structures and of small competitors . . . to maximization 
of consumer welfare, with tolerance for a great deal of market concentration.” Id. at 121 
(emphasis in original). That evolution of the Sherman Act was justified not only because the 
public endorsed it in national elections, but also because “Americans have voted with their 
feet on the issue of localism versus lower prices,” opting for Lowe’s and Home Depot instead 
of “the local hardware store.” Id. at 163. 
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however, elections have not endorsed the courts’ evolutive, common law expansion 
of the APA beyond the boundaries of the text and contrary to Congress’s intent.311 
Superstatute theory typically depends on an agency-centered deliberative 
feedback loop to justify evolutive interpretation of federal superstatutes. Unlike the 
typical superstatute, however, the APA is not administered by a single agency. 
Congress did not vest any single agency with the power to interpret the statute in 
rules or orders.312 It did not anticipate that the statute would be updated 
administratively. To the contrary, Congress anticipated that it would have to update 
the statute itself.313 Certainly, federal agencies interpret the APA. All federal 
agencies do so as they go about their regulatory business; the Justice Department 
does so in litigation; the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the 
Office of Management and Budget does so in the course of reviewing agencies’ 
regulatory proposals; and the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) does so as it studies federal administrative procedure. But none of those 
activities results from a congressional delegation of interpretive authority as it must 
to justify evolutive interpretation,314 and only ACUS arguably meets superstatute 
theory’s other deliberative demands. Thus, in the case of the APA, agencies are not 
at the center of the deliberative universe; courts are, and courts do not engage in the 
civic-republican style of deliberation that superstatute theory demands. Therefore, 
that model of deliberation does not legitimize evolutive interpretation of the APA. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 311. The Sherman Act is also distinguishable from the APA because it is administered by its 
“primary enforcement agent,” the Department of Justice. See id. at 127; see also id. at 134, 140–
41, 153–57. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend for the Sherman 
Act to halt the development of antitrust common law. Lemos, supra note 186, at 429, 461–63. 
 312. See Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: Has It 
Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67 (2011). This lack of single-agency 
administration sets the APA apart from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 43 
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012), another obvious candidate for superstatute status. Like the 
APA, NEPA is not administered by a single agency. Unlike the APA, a particular agency, the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), interprets NEPA in regulations. “NEPA established 
CEQ to assist and advise the President on environmental policy, and a 1977 Executive Order 
charged CEQ with issuing regulations to federal agencies for implementation of NEPA’s 
procedural provisions,” and the Court gives CEQ’s regulations “substantial deference.” Winter 
v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 50 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989). But see Richard 
Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal 
and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 Geo. L.J. 1507, 1563 (2012) (pointing out that questions 
at the oral argument in Winter indicated that “the Justices may harbor some significant doubts 
about [CEQ’s] legitimacy”). 
 313. S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 187, 
216–17. The House ended its report saying: “This bill is not, of course, the final word. It is a 
beginning. If it becomes law, changes may be made in the light of further experience; and 
additions should be made.” H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 177, at 235, 282. 
 314. See supra text accompanying note 276. 
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1. All Agencies 
Each federal agency must interpret the APA in the course of its operations, and 
many agencies issue regulations doing so. For example, the Director of the Federal 
Register has issued regulations interpreting section 552(a)’s provision for publication 
by reference, which requires his approval.315 The FAA’s regulations interpret the 
APA’s rulemaking provisions.316 The Department of Labor’s regulations interpret 
the adjudication provisions.317 And the Department of Health and Human Service’s 
regulations explain when a hearing examiner’s decision becomes “final agency 
action” under the APA.318 
None of those interpretations, however, results from statutory authorization to 
interpret the APA itself, none is binding on any other agency, and none is entitled to 
deference.319 In declining to defer to agency interpretations of the APA, courts have 
reasoned that the APA is not within any particular agency’s expertise, and no agency 
has been charged with its administration.320 Thus, Congress has no reason “to expect 
a dynamic application of the statute.”321 In addition, if multiple agencies interpret the 
same statute, consistency in their interpretations is far from assured.322 
By the same token, agency interpretations of the APA are too diffuse to meet 
superstatute theory’s demand for public deliberation. In a “model deliberation,” the 
agency “considers inputs from a variety of sources” and “accommodates larger 
public norms.”323 But the APA’s effect on the public is indirect. Thus, one wouldn’t 
expect the general public to be aware of, much less participate in, for example, the 
FAA’s development of regulations governing how it develops regulations. Certainly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 315. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012); 1 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2014). 
 316. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 11.1–11.101 (2014). 
 317. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557 (2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.1–18.31 (2014). 
 318. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 81.104 (2014). 
 319. See Jellum, supra note 312. 
 320. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (holding Director of 
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’ interpretation of APA was not entitled to 
Chevron deference in part because the APA “is not a statute that the Director is charged with 
administering”); Prof’l Reactor Operator Soc’y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(“[R]eviewing courts do not owe the same deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes 
that, like the APA, are outside the agency’s particular expertise and special charge to 
administer.”); Air N. Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 937 F.2d 1427, 1436–37 (9th Cir. 1991); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 209 (2006); see also Bowen v. Am. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (explaining that where multiple agencies promulgated 
regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, “[t]here is . . . not the same basis for deference 
predicated on expertise”). 
 321. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 160; see also id. at 269. 
 322. Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Where 
a statute is generic, two bases for the Chevron presumption of implied delegation are lacking: 
specialized agency expertise and the greater likelihood of achieving a unified view through the 
agency than through review in multiple courts.”); Rapaport v. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 
216–17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The alternative would lay the groundwork for a regulatory regime in 
which either the same statute is interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency 
that happens to reach the courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all.”). 
 323. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 265. 
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stakeholders will take notice and the public will too on some occasions, such as when 
an agency decides its action falls within an exception to section 553’s rulemaking 
requirements. Typically, however, when agencies interpret the APA in the normal 
course of business, the public input will lack the “strong connection to the people 
and popular needs” that superstatute theory requires to legitimize evolutive agency 
interpretation.324 
2. The Department of Justice 
The most authoritative executive branch interpretations of the APA come from 
the Justice Department in litigation and particularly from the Office of the Solicitor 
General in the Supreme Court. While Congress has authorized the Attorney General 
to represent the United States in court,325 it has not authorized him to issue binding 
interpretations of the APA and thus has no reason to expect the Act to evolve at his 
hands.326 In addition, although the Justice Department certainly deliberates carefully 
about the positions it takes in litigation, and often reconciles multiple agency 
viewpoints, that process is not the sort of civic republican deliberation that is central 
to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s contention that superstatutes should evolve common-law 
style.327 The give-and-take between the executive and judicial branches in litigation 
is largely deaf to the public’s voice.328 
3. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
OIRA fosters significant deliberation in the development of regulations.329 Since 
the Reagan administration, executive orders have charged OIRA, which is part of the 
Executive Office of the President, with reviewing certain regulatory actions.330 OIRA 
                                                                                                                 
 
 324. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1276. 
 325. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012). 
 326. See supra text accompanying note 276. 
 327. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27 (“[W]e have a dynamic, 
problem-solving, and republican understanding of deliberation.”); see also id. at 21 (noting 
that the title of the book “mobilizes not only the interactive, forward-looking understanding of 
deliberation suggested here, but also the classic republican notion of citizens and public 
leaders acting for the common good”). The lack of republican deliberation may explain 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s assertion that “deference is not appropriate for agency litigating 
positions.” Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1252. 
 328. The Solicitor General’s Office meets regularly with litigants, as well as other entities 
that are interested in cases, but those meetings “are not publicly noted . . . because there really 
isn’t a mechanism to do so.” Tom Goldstein, Practice Before the Office of the Solicitor General: 
Few Secret Meetings, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Jan. 17, 2010, 9:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2010/01/practice-before-the-office-of-the-solicitor-general-few-secret-meetings-2/; see also 
Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here To Help”: Obtaining Amicus 
Support From the Federal Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
209, 215–22 (2009). 
 329. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013). 
 330. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the 
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. 
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functions as, “in large part, an information aggregator,” collecting input on proposed 
regulations from “a wide range of sources both inside and outside the federal 
government.”331 It also meets with members of the public and works to ensure that 
the public-comment process functions properly so that the voices of state and local 
governments, businesses, and public-interest groups are heard.332 And OIRA 
promotes public transparency by posting some information about regulatory 
proposals on the internet.333 Thus, OIRA arguably fosters deliberation.334 
The content of OIRA’s deliberation, however, may not be publicly disclosed,335 
and OIRA plays a passive role: it does not “affirm positions, volunteer information, 
or answer questions.”336 In addition, OIRA’s review process “diffuses power to such 
an extent” between OIRA itself, other White House offices, and other agencies, “that 
at the end of the day, no one is accountable for the results it demands.”337 The quality 
of its deliberation in a civic republican sense is thus questionable.338 
                                                                                                                 
 
REV. 325, 327–41 (2014). 
 331. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1840; see also Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation 
Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1811–12 (2013). But see Heinzerling, 
supra note 330, at 345–46 (finding it “hard to make sense of Sunstein’s portrait of OIRA”). 
 332. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1841, 1859–60. 
 333. See OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., www.reginfo.gov.   
 334. See Nou, supra note 331, at 1812; Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics 
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 62 (2009) (“Given that prompt letters 
communicate the views of the executive branch to agencies in a transparent manner that 
permits public scrutiny and debate, prompt letters further accountable and transparent 
decisionmaking.”). 
 335. See Heinzerling, supra note 330, at 353–55; McGarity, supra note 291, at 1735–37 
(describing the lack of transparency in the OIRA review process); Nou, supra note 331, at 
1823–24 (“Despite provisions under current executive orders for agencies and OIRA to 
disclose the changes made as a result of the presidential review process, such disclosures are 
not regularly made in practice . . . .”); Dan Farber, Confessions of a Regulatory Czar, LEGAL 
PLANET (Feb. 20, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/19886/ 
(“[D]ecision-making may be hidden in a fog of informal interactions within not only the White 
House but the entire executive branch . . . .”). 
 336. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1860. 
 337. Heinzerling, supra note 330, at 326; Farber, supra note 335 (opining that OIRA 
review “dilutes the views of the actors with the most specific expertise” and “reduces 
responsibility and accountability within the executive branch”); Heinzerling, supra note 330, 
at 342 (“[I]t was often hard to tell who exactly was in charge of making the ultimate decision 
on an important regulatory matter.”); id. at 346  (“[A] free-for-all of regulatory power has 
emerged, with no one clearly in charge.”). 
 338. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 15 (explaining that in 
“republican deliberation” participants must contribute to the conversation according to “their 
comparative advantages,” be open to different viewpoints, and “answer for the choices they 
make”); see also Heinzerling, supra note 330, at 364–65 (observing that opacity in government 
“prevents people from understanding the way their government operates, how they can 
intervene and at what points, what the government is up to, who is making important decisions, 
[and] why the government has made those decisions”); McGarity, supra note 291, at 1755–56 
(noting that “[t]ransparency enhances the legitimacy of the rulemaking process . . . and 
generally enhances the quality of the policy decisions that underlie the resulting rules”). 
OIRA’s dubious deliberative process may contribute to what scholars claim is “a profound 
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Moreover, there is no indication that OIRA’s deliberation focuses regularly on the 
meaning of the APA. The governing executive order defines OIRA’s role relative to 
particular “regulatory actions,” not to the regulatory process generally.339 Even 
where OIRA “engages lawyers throughout the executive branch to help resolve . . . 
questions of administrative procedure,”340 that inquiry necessarily will come in the 
context of a particular rule making. For example, if OIRA inquires whether a 
proposed guidance document or interpretive rule requires notice-and-comment rule 
making under section 553 of the APA,341 it may foster deliberation about the meaning 
of section 553, but only with regard to that particular guidance document or 
interpretive rule.342 OIRA’s deliberation, therefore, does not legitimize evolutive 
interpretation of the APA. 
4. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 
Finally, ACUS engages the public in deliberation about the meaning of the APA 
but falls short of superstatute theory’s demands nonetheless. The Conference is 
composed of a presidentially appointed chair, a representative of each federal 
agency, and other individuals appointed by the President or the conference chair.343 
Congress charged ACUS with studying and making recommendations concerning 
federal administrative procedure, as well as collecting and enabling the exchange of 
information that might improve administrative procedure.344 Over the years, ACUS 
has produced important studies and recommendations, some of which contributed to 
                                                                                                                 
 
institutional bias against regulation.” Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized 
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006); see also David M. 
Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 378–80 (2006) (stating 
that OIRA acts as an antiregulatory “one-way ratchet”); Editorial, Stuck in Purgatory, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A22 (calling OIRA “one of the most formidable obstacles to reform”). 
 339. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); id. at 641 (defining “regulatory 
action” as “any substantive action by an agency . . . that promulgates or is expected to lead to 
the promulgation of a final rule or regulation”). Executive Order 12,866 also appointed the 
OIRA Administrator as the convener of a Regulatory Working Group that would analyze 
“important regulatory issues.” Id. at 643. That Group “worked reasonably well during the mid 
and late 90’s as a collegial venue where regulatory policy officers could share best practices 
and vent shared frustrations.” Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and 
Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 105 (2011). However, the Regulatory Working 
Group is no longer functioning. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The 
(Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 997 (2008); Nou, 
supra note 331, at 1816. 
 340. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1842; see also id. at 1842 n.18 (stating “OIRA does not 
have the lead on legal issues”); id at 1872 (explaining that when legal issues arise, “OIRA’s 
role will involve convening, not deciding”). 
 341. See id. at 1853–54. 
 342. It is not surprising, then, that the vast majority of OIRA’s meetings with people outside 
the government are with those who are subject to regulation. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 
338, at 1306–07; McGarity, supra note 291, at 1746; Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1861. 
 343. 5 U.S.C. § 593 (2012). 
 344. 5 U.S.C. § 594 (2012).  
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the 1976 amendment of the APA.345 Additionally, ACUS makes its process open to 
the public.346 Thus, it may provide the best opportunity for the public to provide 
feedback about the APA’s interpretation. 
Like its predecessors,347 however, ACUS does not have general rule-making 
authority under the APA. It may adopt regulations for carrying out its own 
functions,348 but Congress did not delegate to ACUS the authority to issue binding 
interpretations of the APA. Therefore, Congress has no reason “to expect a dynamic 
application of the statute” to emerge from ACUS.349 ACUS may recommend that the 
APA be interpreted broadly and evolutively, but absent a delegation of interpretive 
authority from Congress, superstatute theory would consider its efforts to exceed the 
enacting Congress’s expectations illegitimate.350 
In sum, although the APA bears the hallmarks of an entrenched superstatute, it 
does not undergo the sort of deliberation that superstatute theory demands to justify 
evolutive interpretation. Indeed, as explained in the next Part, superstatute theory 
supports stricter adherence to the text of the APA and allegiance to the compromises 
encoded in that text. 
C. Deliberation-Focused Review of the APA 
Eskridge and Ferejohn did not discuss federal superstatutes like the APA that are 
not subject to a deliberative feedback loop involving an administering agency, 
Congress, the President, the public, and the courts. I apply their theory to this new 
category of superstatutes. It is counterintuitive to think of Eskridge and Ferejohn as 
cautioning that one hesitate before stretching the text of a superstatute, but in the case 
of the APA, that is the result their theory yields. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 345. See Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of 
Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 
155, 183–85 (1998); see also Paul R. Verkuil, What the Return of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States Means for Administrative Law, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. 
L. 17, 21–25, 30–31 (2012) (describing how ACUS works and listing ACUS studies related 
to environmental law). 
 346. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLIC MEETING POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES (2013), available at http://acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Public
%20Meeting%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%20FINAL.pdf; ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, PUBLIC COMMENT POLICY, available at http://acus.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/Public%20Comment%20Policy.pdf. 
 347. For a brief history of ACUS and its predecessors, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ACUS 2.0 
and its Historical Antecedents, 36 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 9 (2011). 
 348. 5 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2) (2012). 
 349. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 160. 
 350. See supra text accompanying notes 276, 283; cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (holding that agency statutory interpretations receive Chevron deference 
only when the agency’s interpretation has the force of law and that “Congress contemplates 
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force,” such as rulemaking or adjudication). 
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1. Deliberation-Respecting, -Inducing, and -Rewarding Review 
Because the Constitution itself is so hard to amend, the evolution of large “C” 
Constitutional law is left to “the potentially countermajoritarian and out-of-touch 
discretion of unelected judges.”351 Eskridge and Ferejohn believe the Supreme Court 
has steered between “the Scylla of Constitutional ossification and the Charybdis of 
Court tyranny” using small “c” constitutionalism, that is, statutory evolution.352 For the 
law to evolve through small “c” constitutionalism without undermining democracy, 
however, Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that courts should be 
“deliberation-respecting,”353 “deliberation-inducing,”354 and “deliberation-
rewarding.”355 
Courts should be “deliberation-respecting” insofar as they should consider 
deliberative materials like a statute’s legislative and administrative history, recognize 
the “significant normative force” of deliberative processes, and defer to laws and 
policies “that reflect the deliberated views of Congress and the president.”356 Thus, the 
Supreme Court “ought to give the benefit of every Constitutional doubt” to superstatutes 
because they arise from “intense public debate and congressional deliberation.”357 
Where the Court believes that Congress, the President, or an agency is skirting 
the constitutional edge or “push[ing] superstatutory evolution into significant 
collision with other fundamental norms,” Eskridge and Ferejohn suggest that judicial 
review should be “deliberation-inducing,” that is, it should invite further 
deliberation.358 Similarly, when the political system has been unresponsive or has 
broken down, the Court should “reverse the burden of inertia” in Congress359 and 
“jump-start the political process by forcing a fundamental normative discussion.”360 
In essence, courts should “treat[] the legislative process like a lower court and 
impose[] fact finding and other requirements,”361 because “important shifts of a 
constitutional magnitude ought not to be made without deliberation that is open and 
public; reasoned and factual; and legitimate.”362 Courts may trigger further civic 
deliberation by effectively remanding cases to the political branches using, for 
example, the canon of constitutional avoidance or void-for-vagueness doctrine.363 
                                                                                                                 
 
 351. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 434–35. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 22–23 (emphasis in original).  
 354. Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). 
 355. Id. at 24 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 435–37; Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
Constitutional Horticulture, supra note 2. 
 356. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 266, 296, 435–36. 
 357. Id. at 435. 
 358. Id. at 289, 436 (emphasis omitted). 
 359. Id. at 24. 
 360. Id. at 56; see also id. at 288–89, 456. Eskridge and Ferejohn view Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as an example of deliberation-inducing judicial review. Id. at 456. 
 361. Id. at 435. 
 362. Id. at 289. 
 363. See id. at 464. Thus, in Heller v. District of Columbia, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue 
that the Court ought to have invoked the avoidance canon and interpreted federal law to 
preempt the District’s gun regulation, thus invalidating the regulation, but not ending the 
public debate. Id. 
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Finally, judicial review should be “deliberation-rewarding”364 or 
“deliberation-encouraging,”365 in that courts should defer to agency interpretations 
that result from an effective deliberative process.366 When courts interpret 
superstatutes they “should be particularly attentive to agency interpretations and the 
reasons given by an agency” for its interpretation.367 That deference is due not because 
agencies are expert or because they are accountable to the people through the President, 
but because their statutory interpretations result from a deliberative, interactive public 
process: provision of public notice, receipt and serious consideration of public 
comments, and publication of an explanation for the agency’s decision, followed by 
judicial review and congressional reaffirmation of the agency’s initiative.368 
2. Interpreting the APA 
For a typical superstatute, Eskridge and Ferejohn advocate interpretations that 
stretch the text, even beyond Congress’s intent. For the APA, such evolutive 
interpretation is unjustified. Because there is no single agency charged with 
implementing the APA, Congress is the locus of all deliberation about the Act that 
involves the public enough to be legitimate. Thus, deliberation-respecting, -inducing, 
and -rewarding review focuses the courts’ attention on Congress. Courts should remain 
within the boundaries of the APA’s text. To fully understand that text, however, courts 
must understand the Act’s history and context, both pre- and post-enactment. 
Deliberation-respecting review of the APA requires the courts to give effect to the 
compromises encoded in the Act.369 Respecting legislative compromise is critical to 
interpreting the APA because the Act itself was a monumental compromise.370 As 
the Supreme Court recognized in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, “The Act . . . 
represents a long period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought 
contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces 
have come to rest. It contains many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, 
some ambiguities.”371 
                                                                                                                 
 
 364. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). 
 365. Id. at 279 (emphasis omitted). 
 366. See id.  
 367. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 36. 
 368. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 161, 265 (“[J]udicial review 
of agency interpretations of law ought to be especially deferential when the agency has 
engaged in model deliberation . . . .”); see also id. at 277–79; Eskridge, America’s Statutory 
“constitution,” supra note 9, at 37 (“I would insist that the democratic accountability reason 
for deference be considered more from the bottom up (American people interacting with the 
agency) rather than just the top down (President directing the agency to act).”). 
 369. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 1309; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 
9, at 1247; Strauss, supra note 62, at 768–69, 781, 785. 
 370. See Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 705–06. 
 371. 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950). The Court went on to say that it should give effect to the 
APA’s “remedial purposes,” id. at 41, essentially calling for a purposive approach the Act’s 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the Court grappled with the text and legislative history, and ultimately 
based its decision on constitutional avoidance doctrine, not legislative purpose. See id. at 48–51. 
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The notion that lawmaking inevitably requires legislators to compromise is the 
foundation of what John Manning calls “second-generation textualism.”372 
Legislative compromises may result in a statute whose means “do not fully 
effectuate the ends that inspired” the law.373 Thus, courts that focus on a statute’s 
purposes instead of its “implemental detail” risk undermining complex legislative 
bargains.374 To respect legislative compromise, second-generation textualists pay 
close attention to statutory text. 
Eskridge agrees that courts must respect compromises encoded in legislation, but 
he disagrees with Manning about what an interpreter examines to understand a 
legislative compromise. Where Manning would have courts focus on the enacted 
text, Eskridge would have courts consider in addition “the context of the statute, . . . 
the explanation of the deal in the committee reports, and the statute’s purpose,” as 
well as evidence of interest groups’ views.375 Indeed, as Victoria Nourse points out, 
it may be necessary to examine legislative history simply to identify which statutory 
provisions are compromises.376 Eskridge and Nourse have the stronger position in 
this debate. Some provisions of the APA represent “wins” for the conservative 
minority, others reflect the success of the liberal majority to dilute conservative 
proposals, and many were compromises.377 The text alone does not reveal which is 
which. Hence, to give sufficient weight to the bargain Congress and the President 
made in 1946, the courts must understand the APA’s full context and history.378 
Deliberation-respecting review also requires the courts to examine ongoing 
deliberation on particular provisions of the APA.379 Peter Strauss contends that the 
Supreme Court failed to do that when it invalidated a Department of Labor 
burden-shifting rule in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 372. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290 
(2010).This article appears in an issue honoring Philip Frickey, William Eskridge’s frequent 
coauthor. Editor’s Note, 98 CALIF. L. REV. ii (2010). 
 373. Manning, supra note 372, at 1304. 
 374. Id.; see also id. at 1290, 1310–11. 
 375. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2053 (2006) 
(reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 633–34 & n.48 (1990). 
 376. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History 
by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 119 (2012) (arguing that one cannot identify compromises in 
legislation “without looking at the legislative history and the rules governing it”); see also 
Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 42, at 741–43 (pointing out that some kinds of 
legislative history reflect legislative intent more accurately than statutory text); Gluck & 
Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 911 (calling for “a more nuanced account of how statutes 
are produced in the modern regulatory state”); Nourse, supra, at 138 n.296.  
 377. See generally Shepherd, supra note 3. 
 378. Cf. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 965 (reporting that in empirical study 
of congressional staffers, “legislative history was emphatically viewed by almost all . . . 
respondents—Republicans and Democrats, majority and minority—as the most important 
drafting and interpretive tool apart from text” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 967–90 
(examining role of legislative history in statutory drafting process and concluding that “the 
real question about legislative history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather, how to 
separate the useful from the misleading”). 
 379. Cf. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 297–98. 
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Greenwich Collieries.380 The APA provides that “the proponent of a rule or order 
has the burden of proof.”381 For decades, the agency had imposed on benefits 
claimants only the burden of production.382 The Court invalidated the agency’s 
approach, holding that the APA requires claimants to carry the burden of 
persuasion.383 Strauss argues that, in reaching that result, the Court ignored 
post-1946 legislation, regulations interpreting other statutes, and court decisions.384 
If Strauss is correct, the Greenwich Collieries Court did not show sufficient respect 
for ongoing deliberation to legitimize its ruling.385 
Of course, ongoing deliberation may render administrative common law that once 
contradicted Congress’s intent innocuous. Just as the 1982 amendments to the 
Endangered Species Act endorsed the Interior Department’s broad interpretation of 
“harm,”386 so too might an amendment of the APA endorse a court’s broad 
interpretation of the APA. Mere congressional silence is not likely to reflect 
sufficient deliberation to legitimize administrative common law that contradicts the 
enacting Congress’s intent.387 Chevron, however, may be an exception. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 380. See Strauss, supra note 245, at 1413–19 (discussing Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994)).  
 381. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). 
 382. See Strauss, supra note 245, at 1417–19. 
 383. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 276. 
 384. Strauss, supra note 245, at 1418–20; Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds 
of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 487–88 [hereinafter Strauss, On 
Resegregating]. Strauss argues that the APA should not be limited to its ordinary meaning in 
1946, but rather is “an evolving statute,” though its “evolution, to be sure, [is] limited by the 
possibilities of its text.” Strauss, supra note 245, at 1420. 
 385. For a typical superstatute, deliberation-respecting review would also entail 
considering the statute’s administrative history, that is, how the agency has implemented the 
statute. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 266. Since the APA is not 
administered by any particular agency, however, such agency-based deliberation is absent. For 
the same reason, judicial interpretations of the APA cannot be deliberation-rewarding because 
there is no agency interpretation of the APA that is entitled to deference. See text 
accompanying notes 319–320. 
 386. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 274, 297. 
 387. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 1328–29 (arguing that Congress has not acquiesced in 
the presumption of reviewability); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts 
of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 (2005) (arguing that congressional acquiescence does 
not support statutory stare decisis in the federal courts of appeals); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) (arguing that legislative 
acquiescence does not justify the “super-strong presumption against overruling statutory 
precedents,” id. at 1363, because “[i]n most instances, Congress is either not aware of the 
Court’s statutory interpretations or faces no formal opportunity to examine those 
interpretations,” id. at 1404, and “[e]ven when those interpretations are brought to the attention 
of a congressional committee, the rest of Congress usually remains unaware of them,” id.). 
But see Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1461 
(2014) (“When the Court has interpreted a statute and Congress has engaged in an open, 
deliberative, and pluralistic appraisal of the Court’s decision without overriding it, that ought 
to be an additional reason for the Court to be reluctant to overrule its statutory precedent.”). 
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Congressional staffers are clearly aware of Chevron’s deference doctrine,388 and in 
each new statute providing rule-making authority, Congress may provide that 
Chevron does not apply.389 Moreover, Chevron survived efforts to reverse it in the 
Bumpers Amendment, which was the subject of significant deliberation.390 
The courts’ interpretation of the APA also should seek to induce further 
deliberation in Congress. Superstatute theory would not accept judicial 
deliberation as a “second best” alternative but instead would prefer that courts 
respect, induce, and reward a civic-republican style of deliberation.391 If the 
boundaries of the APA’s possible meaning need to be extended, the courts should 
prod Congress to extend them.392 Indeed, that appears to be the preference of those 
who draft federal statutes. The respondents in Gluck and Bressman’s 
groundbreaking empirical study of congressional drafting practices reported that 
“they would rather have difficult questions returned to Congress than resolved by 
judges.”393 Perhaps the Court in Greenwich Collieries adhered to the APA’s 
meaning in 1946 in an effort to encourage Congress to update the statute to 
“capture[] the new social and political realities.”394 
                                                                                                                 
 
 388. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 927, 993–98. 
 389. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a), 
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012) (providing that certain rules of the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency be reviewed, consistent with Skidmore, based on “the thoroughness evident in 
the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency 
with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court finds 
persuasive and relevant to its decision”). Thanks to Asher Steinberg for this point. 
 390. See Levin, Review, supra note 253, at 358–66; O’Reilly, supra note 253, at 747–67. 
“The so-called Bumpers Amendment went through several iterations and in its mature form 
provided that courts should ‘independently decide all relevant questions of law’ and that ‘in 
making determinations on . . . questions of law, the court shall not accord any presumption in 
favor of or against agency action.’” William R. Andersen, Against Chevron—A Modest 
Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957, 974 (2004). 
 391. See supra Part IV.C.1; see also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Second Best 
& Nonideal Theory, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2014), http://lsolum.typepad.com
/legaltheory/2014/09/legal-theory-lexicon-second-best-nonideal-theory.html (“[W]hen the 
first-best policy option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider 
second-best solutions.”). 
 392. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2162, 2165, 2967 (2002) (arguing that canons of statutory interpretation serve 
preference-eliciting functions designed “to provoke a legislative reaction that resolves the 
statutory indeterminacy and thus creates an ultimate statutory result that reflects enactable 
political preferences more accurately than any judicial estimate possibly could”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317, 335 (2000) (arguing that certain 
“nondelegation canons” of statutory interpretation, like the canon disfavoring extraterritorial 
application of federal law and the canon disfavoring interpretations that raise serious 
constitutional doubts, “represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed 
to ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree”). 
 393. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 1015; see also Bressman & Gluck, Part 
II, supra note 42, at 773–74. 
 394. Strauss, supra note 245, at 1421. Congress has not overruled Greenwich Collieries. 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 
267 (1994). 
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The bottom line is that identifying a statute as a superstatute does not necessarily 
justify interpreting that statute broadly, much less exceeding Congress’s intentions. 
One cannot simply dub the APA a superstatute and announce that it must therefore be 
interpreted to evolve beyond the boundaries of the text. Rather, given the extraordinary 
legislative process that led to the APA’s enactment and the relative paucity of 
agency-based deliberative feedback since then, courts should be particularly cautious 
about interpreting the APA’s text in a way that shifts the balance Congress reached 
through the political process. Courts should look closely at the APA’s individual 
provisions, including Congress’s treatment of each provision in the original legislative 
process and the quality of deliberation the provision has seen since enactment.395 
D. Administrative Common Law’s Weakness 
Just as Kryptonite weakens Superman,396 superstatute theory weakens 
administrative common law. The flaw superstatute theory reveals in administrative 
common law is not simply its derivation in countermajoritarian courts.397 Rather, the 
problem is that the courts are not engaged in a deliberative feedback loop with an 
agency that in turn parleys with the public and (unlike the other branches of 
government) has an obligation to respond to the public’s views.398 This deliberation 
deficiency makes it problematic to stretch the APA’s text too far, much less impose 
doctrines of administrative common law that extend the law beyond the text’s 
breaking point and conflict with Congress’s intent.399 
As mentioned in Part I, although scholars have endorsed administrative common 
law since the APA was enacted, Gillian Metzger has written its most comprehensive 
and convincing defense.400 Metzger believes that little can be gained by resisting 
administrative common law and that any debate about administrative common law 
devolves to an inquiry about “whether a particular instance of judicial lawmaking 
falls within the acceptable range.”401 To enable that inquiry, Metzger prescribes 
increased judicial candor.402 
                                                                                                                 
 
 395. Interpretation of the APA should be tailored to the unique circumstances of this 
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In many ways, Metzger’s analysis is right on target. Administrative common law 
may be important and unavoidable in some contexts, and the courts certainly should 
be more transparent in their development of administrative common law. Applying 
superstatute theory to the APA, however, reveals a principal weakness in 
administrative common law: the absence of ongoing public deliberation about the 
APA at the agency level renders administrative common law suspect and requires 
the courts to pay closer attention to the APA itself and to the legislative process. Even 
Metzger’s formidable defense cannot stand up to the deliberation deficiency 
superstatute theory exposes in the APA. 
For administrative common law to be legitimate, it must answer concerns related 
to not only separation of powers and political accountability but also public 
deliberation. The separation-of-powers objection to common law is familiar. The 
Constitution separates Congress’s power to make laws from the courts’ power to 
interpret laws in order to avoid tyranny and safeguard liberty.403 As Thomas Merrill 
concluded, “[I]nstitutionalization of lawmaking by federal courts would represent a 
major shift in policymaking power away from Congress and toward the federal 
judiciary, in violation of the constitutional scheme.”404 I do not claim that all federal 
common law raises separation-of-powers concerns, but administrative common law 
that ignores or contradicts the APA certainly does. 
Metzger argues that separation-of-powers concerns are not an “obstacle” to 
administrative common law because administrative common law “can advance 
separation of powers values” by structuring the relationships between the 
branches.405 Certainly the courts may “preserve checks and balances and avoid a 
single branch’s aggrandizement” on some occasions,406 but that does not solve the 
fundamental problem of the courts believing that they have the power to decide 
whether and when to do so.407 Metzger claims that Congress’s power to override 
administrative common law decisions can prevent excessive judicial 
aggrandizement, particularly if courts are more candid in developing administrative 
common law.408 Even if congressional vetogates did not hinder the passage of 
legislation,409 the possibility of a legislative override does not justify the courts 
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invading Congress’s lawmaking turf in the first place.410 Moreover, Metzger admits 
that a lack of judicial candor makes it difficult for the political branches to respond 
effectively to court decisions,411 and she doesn’t explain how more judicial candor 
will solve that problem given that it is Congress’s inability to act which she contends 
makes administrative common law inevitable.412 
Even if traditional separation-of-powers concerns do not undermine 
administrative common law’s legitimacy, there is the related but distinct problem of 
its lack of political accountability.413 Thomas Merrill explained that federal common 
law is constrained not just by federalism and separation of powers but also by “the 
principle that public policy should be made by officials who are answerable to the 
people through periodic elections.”414 The fact that federal judges are not elected 
cannot bar judicial lawmaking, he posited, since the Constitution designed the federal 
courts that way.415 Nonetheless, “[a]ny exercise of lawmaking by federal courts 
represents a potential erosion of the principle of electoral accountability and hence 
presents a problem of legitimacy.”416 
Just as administrative common law can further separation-of-powers values, 
Metzger argues, so too can it address the concern about political accountability “by 
fostering effective congressional and presidential controls on administrative 
action.”417 That the Court may choose to enhance the political accountability of 
agencies in certain cases, however, does not make the Court itself politically 
accountable when creating administrative common law. 
Metzger makes a valid point in arguing that separation-of-powers and political 
accountability objections to common law go too far. If those objections are sustained, 
then all common law is constitutionally illegitimate, and such an absolute objection 
to common law does not comport with current legal doctrine, which acknowledges 
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that courts may sometimes “create law.”418 The Administrative Procedure Act is 
distinguishable, however, because Congress and the President put so much effort into 
shaping this law, both before and after its enactment. The Act’s history raises the 
separation-of-powers stakes. Saying that the courts should respect that exceptional 
legislative effort is not tantamount to saying that courts should never make law. Rather, 
it simply urges that judicial review should be deliberation-respecting. In any event, I 
do not take issue with administrative common law where Congress has carved out 
space for it or employed terms so capacious as to invite it.419 Rather, my focus here is 
on administrative common law that contravenes or ignores the APA, instances when 
the courts have not exercised their usual caution in fashioning federal common law. 
Moreover, superstatute theory reveals a third legitimacy problem with this kind 
of administrative common law in addition to separation of powers and political 
accountability: lack of public deliberation. Eskridge and Ferejohn explained that the 
common-law approach to constitutional law has the benefit of allowing the 
Constitution to be updated over time, but it is “unconnected to public feedback” and 
thus “runs the risk of alienating fundamental law from popular sources of 
legitimacy.”420 Similarly, administrative common law provides an efficient means of 
updating the law, but it is virtually unmoored from public deliberation because there is 
no agency that has the authority to issue binding interpretations of the APA and that 
engages in an ongoing dialogue with both the courts and the public.421 Indeed, Metzger 
recognizes that administrative common law is difficult “to square with the principle of 
democratic government,” given that it is “shielded from public acknowledgment and 
scrutiny.”422 This is administrative common law’s principal weakness. 
Just as administrative common law may further separation-of-powers values and 
foster political accountability, so too may it enhance public deliberation.423 The courts 
developed common law governing rule-making procedures, for example, “to facilitate 
meaningful public participation and transparency in rulemaking.”424 But the public 
involvement that body of common law may facilitate typically concerns an agency’s 
interpretation of a substantive statute, not the APA, and thus does not facilitate 
civic-republican deliberation about the APA or the common law doctrines themselves. 
Moreover, administrative common law can have unforeseen consequences.425 The 
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common law governing notice-and-comment rulemaking contributed to regulatory 
ossification.426 Perhaps if those common law requirements had been subject to more 
civic-republic deliberation, that result could have been avoided. As Nicholas Bagley 
said in reference to the common law presumption of reviewability, Congress struck a 
balance “between a host of incommensurate values. It is Congress’s role, not the 
courts’, to strike that balance. . . . The courts have no constitutional authority to revise 
that judgment and no epistemic basis for thinking they can make a better one.”427 
Metzger argues that administrative common law is inevitable because Congress 
cannot keep statutes up to date, much less constrain agencies effectively. That 
disability requires the courts to step in to keep agencies in line.428 Yet, administrative 
common law is not always inevitable, as evidenced by Vermont Yankee,429 
Greenwich Collieries,430 Dickinson v. Zurko,431 and other cases in which the Supreme 
Court adhered strictly to the text of the APA. Judicial review can respect the 
deliberation that has occurred and instigate further deliberation. Wong Yang Sung432 
is a prime example: within six months of the Supreme Court’s decision that the APA 
applied to Immigration and Naturalization Service adjudications, Congress 
overturned it.433 The APA saw significant deliberation pre-enactment, and it has seen 
much deliberation since.434 In fact, the APA is currently the subject of heated debate 
in Congress.435 To respect that deliberation and encourage further deliberation, the 
courts should stay within the boundaries of the APA’s text and prod Congress to 
answer the unanswered questions.436 
One might object that Congress is too dysfunctional to be the focus of 
deliberation. The 111th Congress, however, from January 2009 to January 2011, was 
the most productive in decades.437 As Matthew Christiansen and William Eskridge 
                                                                                                                 
 
law presumption of reviewability). 
 426. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To 
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483–84 
(1997) (“[D]evelopments in administrative law over the past two decades that were meant to 
expand public participation and influence in administrative decisionmaking have 
unintentionally” led to “ossification.”). 
 427. Bagley, supra note 48, at 1330; see also id. at 1322. 
 428. See Metzger, supra note 16, at 1322, 1329, 1331. 
 429. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 430. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 
512 U.S. 267 (1994). 
 431. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 432. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 433. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955). 
 434. See supra Parts III.A, C. 
 435. See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2013, S. 15, 
113th Cong. (2013). 
 436. Of course, Congress may debate and override administrative common law decisions, 
but the possibility of after-the-fact legislative deliberation does not legitimize the courts’ 
disrespect for deliberation that came before. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 22, 26. 
 437. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 
2078, 2085 (2013); David A. Fahrenthold, Philip Rucker & Felicia Sonmez, Stormy 111th 
Congress Was Still the Most Productive in Decades, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/22/AR2010122205620.html. 
2015] ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW 1259 
 
found in their empirical study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation decisions, “Congress is capable of policy responses even in periods of 
divided government and partisan acrimony.”438 The APA itself has seen significant 
legislative deliberation in recent years.439 So, Congress does still deliberate. 
Nonetheless, even if Congress is dysfunctional, that does not justify abandoning the 
constitutional design and allowing courts to enable that dysfunction. 
Deliberation-respecting review of the APA would be the death knell of 
administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA. For example, the 
same arbitrary or capricious standard of review applies to all agencies, and the history 
of the APA confirms that Congress intended for all agencies to be treated alike. The 
courts’ practice of giving super deference to particular agencies, like the military, 
exceeds the boundaries of the text and contradicts Congress’s intent, making it 
illegitimate.440 The same can be said of prudential ripeness doctrine, which 
contradicts the APA’s provision of a cause of action for any person with the requisite 
harm who challenges “final agency action” by injecting considerations of judicial 
competence.441 Many of the courts’ rulemaking requirements exceed the boundaries 
of the APA’s text.442 In the pending case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 
the Supreme Court should reverse the D.C. Circuit’s holding that agencies must go 
through notice and comment before significantly revising interpretive rules because 
that holding directly contradicts the APA.443 Similarly, Judge Kavanaugh observed 
that the Portland Cement doctrine, which requires agencies to disclose the studies 
upon which they rely in rulemaking, “cannot be squared with the text of § 553.”444 
Finally, in employing Chevron doctrine—aside from the efforts of individual justices 
in dissents—the Court has largely ignored the APA. It is entirely possible that the 
current view of Chevron can be harmonized with statutory text and history,445 but the 
Court must do so if it is to pay adequate respect to civic-republican deliberation. 
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In the end, Metzger may not disagree with my contention that these and other 
doctrines of administrative common law should fall. She points out that “[s]ome 
judicial moves may be deemed unsupportable because they simply conflict too much 
with governing statutes.”446 But Metzger starts from the position that administrative 
common law is important, inevitable, and legitimate.447 I start from the opposite 
position—that administrative common law is suspect. Courts should respect the 
civic-republican deliberation reflected in the APA’s text and in the pre- and 
post-enactment legislative history and avoid shifting the balance Congress reached 
through the political process. 
CONCLUSION 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory of superstatutes makes an important contribution to 
the law. Among many other things, it provides a lens through which we may examine 
particular statutes. Viewing the APA through that lens reveals unexpected results. 
Instead of supporting broad, evolutive interpretations of the APA, superstatute theory 
advises closer adherence to the statute’s text and Congress’s expectations. 
The APA is a quasi-constitutional, entrenched superstatute. Unlike a typical 
superstatute, however, the APA is not administered by a single agency. Hence, the 
APA is not subject to the sort of administrative deliberation upon which superstatute 
theory depends to justify interpreting superstatutes evolutively. The public is not 
included in any feedback loop with an agency, Congress, the President, and the courts 
engaged in interpreting the APA. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn did not discuss statutes like the APA that bear the 
hallmarks of a superstatute but are not subject to an administrative feedback loop. 
Nonetheless, their work points in a particular direction, albeit not the direction one 
might anticipate. Rather than supporting evolutive interpretations of the APA, 
superstatute theory’s focus on deliberation counsels hesitation before stretching the 
terms of the statute. In the absence of an administering agency, Congress is the locus 
of public deliberation about the APA. Thus, deliberation-focused review of the APA 
centers on the deliberation in the legislative process before and after 1946 and 
requires close attention to the compromises encoded in the Act. If that inquiry does 
not answer a question that requires an answer, the courts should prod Congress to 
deliberate further and provide an answer. 
Administrative common law contradicts that deliberation-focused approach. In 
other areas of the law, an agency links judicial consideration to the public, the 
President, and Congress. But when courts impose rules of administrative law that 
stretch the APA’s text beyond its breaking point, those rules are unmoored from any 
public deliberation and therefore cannot be considered legitimate. 
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